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This thesis is a study on U.S. punitive measures against foreign firms. Based on the U.S. 
government’s campaign on Huawei Technologies, it shows how U.S. punitive measures may 
inflict profound financial impact on the targeted firm and some of its key stakeholders, how 
punitive measures may cause further implications beyond the intended purposes, and how 
punitive measures may be inconsistent with the rules under the WTO system.   
Based on the findings, a theoretical framework for determining the optimal strategy against 
punitive measures imposed by a foreign government has been created. The framework provide 
concrete suggestions on how a firm should counter punitive measures, based on the two 
general dimensions of (1) how severely the punitive measures impact the firm, and (2) the ease 
for the firm to find alternative (input or output). 
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Clarification of Terminology 
Punitive measure:  
In this thesis, the term punitive measure is used as an all-inclusive term to cover “any measure 
that is damaging to the firm targeted”. Within the literature, the term sanction is frequently 
used to describe this type of measure; however, a sanction is often understood as a negative 
reaction for disobeying a law or a rule (Cambridge dictionary, n.d., Definition 2). However, a 
punitive measure might be imposed without judicial justification, and governments may 
intentionally be ambiguous when imposing such measure so not to be perceived as a sanction. 
From a firm-level perspective, the semantics of whether a measure is a sanction or not is not 
essential; what is, from a managerial point of view, is the economic implications a punitive 
measure will inflict on the firm.   
The term punitive measure is also used to avoid the mix-up between a sanction as a general 
penalty, and a violation of the U.S. sanctions programme. To further clarify, a sanction is 
indeed a punitive measure, but a punitive measure is not necessarily a sanction.  
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On 14 December 2009, Oslo became the first city in the world where commercial 4G mobile 
network was made available to the public. At that time, not many outside the 
telecommunications industry would be familiar with the name of the firm that supplied the 
technology – Huawei. A decade later, many countries have been preparing to roll-out the fifth-
generation mobile networks, also known as 5G. Huawei will again play a crucial role in the 
deployment of the technology, but as it does, it enjoys a far greater brand recognition than it 
did a decade ago. This greater brand recognition is partly due to the growth of its consumer 
electronic products, including smartphones, tablets, and laptops. It is also, and perhaps more 
so, due to an aggressive campaign launched by the U.S. government against the firm – where 
Huawei has been on the receiving end of a wide range of punitive measures.  
Few firms have been imposed more punitive measures by the U.S. government than what 
Huawei has been facing in the past decade. Among the many U.S. punitive measures imposed 
on the firm are:  blocking its deals with U.S. firms; forcing it to divest its U.S. assets; imposing 
a travel ban on its employees; adding it to its trade blacklist; arresting its CFO; banning its 
equipment from being used within the U.S. market; and pressuring other nations also to ban 
its equipment from their markets.  
From an international business perspective, the U.S.’s campaign against Huawei is interesting 
for at least two reasons: Firstly, because it illustrates the different tactics the U.S. government 
is willing to employ on foreign firms to protect its interests. Secondly, because international 
firms can better assess the political risks they face when operating in foreign markets. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to answer the following questions:  
1. How can U.S. punitive measures impact the targeted firm and other stakeholders?  
2. How do these punitive measures stand in the context of international trade rules? 
3. How can firms prevent or cope with punitive measures imposed by foreign governments? 
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2. The Huawei Case 
2.1 Historical background 
Huawei Technologies was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former engineer in the People’s 
Liberation Army, China’s armed forces. Ren established Huawei in the coastal city of 
Shenzhen, in the southern province of Guangdong, and the closest neighbouring city of Hong 
Kong. In 1980, Shenzhen had been designated by the Chinese government as a special 
economic zone, enjoying “special financial, investment and trade privileges” (Zeng, 2010, p. 
9). The government’s goal was to use Shenzhen as a test lab for the country’s changing policy 
from a planned economy to a market economy.  
In the first years of business, Huawei’s primary source of revenue came from reselling private 
branch exchange switches1 imported from Hong Kong. At that time, China did not have its 
own national telecommunication equipment industry and therefore relied on imports. 
Huawei’s vision was to become a firm that could compete with major international telecom 
firms, such as Ericsson, Alcatel, Motorola, and Nokia. While many Chinese firms opted to 
enter international joint-ventures with foreign firms, which was a common strategy for many 
Chinese firms that lacked technological know-how, Huawei chose to invest heavily in R&D 
to develop its technology in-house.  
By 1993, Huawei had successfully developed its own large-scale switch. It had also 
strategically chosen to serve the rural areas of China, while major international firms only had 
a significant market presence in China’s most advanced cities. With no major competitors in 
the rural areas, Huawei quickly captured the market shares of these areas. As its revenue 
continued to grow, it kept scaling up its R&D investments and expanding its product focus to 
routers and mobile communications equipment. Its innovation strategy focused on reverse 
engineering basic products and then develop more advanced products based on the original 
ones. It also was an eager purchaser of international consulting services, especially IBM 
consultants who helped organise and manage its R&D processes (Ahrens, 2013).  
 
1 Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is a switch system that allows for intercommunication between telephones within an 
organisation without using external telephone lines 
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In the mid-1990s, the Chinese government revised its telecommunications equipment policy 
to reduce its reliance on imports and promote its domestic manufacturers (DeWoskin, 2001). 
Fronted as a national champion, Huawei’s sales in the cities and other urban areas expanded. 
It also received sizeable loans from state-owned banks, which with the government’s new 
policy, is likely to have come with favourable terms and conditions.  
By the late-1990s, Huawei started pushing for international expansion, primarily in other 
developing markets. In 1997 it entered the Russian market, followed by Thailand, Brazil, and 
South Africa. Suffering from negative country-of-origin effects at the time, as a Chinese 
manufacturer, it had to undercut international prices to win contracts abroad. Through its cost 
innovation strategy2 and settling for lower profit margins, it was able to expand in several 
developing markets successfully. In 2001, Huawei pushed for international expansion in 
developed markets, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the United States. While 
it was able to win projects in the European countries, it was not able to do so within the first 
three years in the American market.  
In 2005, Huawei’s overseas markets revenue exceeded its domestic market revenue.  Seven 
years later, in 2012, it surpassed then global telecommunications leader, Swedish Ericsson, in 
both sales’ revenue and net profit (De Cremer & Tao, 2015). 
 In 2009, Swedish network operator TeliaSonera chose Huawei as a partner to build out the 
first 4G networks in the world, in the Nordic capitals of Stockholm and Oslo3 (Financial 
Times, 18 December 2009). It represented a milestone for the Chinese telecom firm, as it 
illustrated how Huawei had successfully managed to develop its own cutting-edge technology 
that could compete with European industry leaders, such as Ericsson’s and Nokia’s.  
Since 2009, Huawei’s global market share of telecommunications equipment has continued to 
increase. In the 2010s, the firm also increased its focus on developing smartphones. By 2020, 
Huawei had become the technological leader of the 5G network deployment. In the second 
 
2 A strategy centred in deploying cost advantages from emerging economies to radically offer customers “dramatically more 
utility for less expenditure” (Williamson, 2009, p. 433) 
3 Huawei’s build-out of 4G in Oslo is also mentioned in Chapter 1.  
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quarter of 2020, its smartphone shipments exceeded that of both Samsung and Apple, making 
it the world’s largest smartphone manufacturer in that quarter.  
2.2 U.S. government’s punitive measures against Huawei 
The U.S. government’s campaign against Huawei follows a series of accusations against the 
Chinese telecommunications firm. These accusations include that it has been stealing trade 
secrets from the U.S. and violating its Iran sanctions; that its telecom equipment poses a 
national security threat; that it has been given an unfair amount of subsidies by the Chinese 
government, and that it is under the control or strong influence of the Chinese military.  As a 
result, the U.S. government has imposed a series of punitive measures against the firm. This 
section will present these punitive measures in a chronological order.  
March 2008: Blocking Huawei’s deal with U.S. electronics manufacturer 3Com 
On September 2007, U.S. private equity firm Bain Capital partnered with Huawei 
Technologies to purchase U.S. electronics manufacturer 3Com, giving Huawei a 16.5 per cent 
stake and board representation. The deal was called off after the U.S. Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) signalled it would block the transaction. In the 
backdrop, U.S. lawmakers raised concerns that the deal would threaten U.S.’ national security 
due to allegations that Huawei had close ties to the People’s Liberation Army (Reuters, 23 
February 2008).  
December 2010: Political pressure for U.S. Sprint Nextel to rejects Huawei bid to 
upgrade its mobile carrier network 
On December 2010, U.S. mobile network operator Sprint Nextel rejected Huawei’s bid to 
upgrade its mobile carrier network, choosing French Alcatel, Swedish Ericsson and Korean 
Samsung to work with its projects. The move came after intense political pressure from U.S. 
lawmakers to reject Huawei’s bid for their projects, citing national security concerns. The U.S. 
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke was reported to have made a personal telephone call to 
Sprint Nextel’s CEO to express his deep concerns over Huawei’s bid (Bloomberg, 7 December 
2010), and a letter by U.S. lawmakers stated that they found it “most troubling” that Huawei’s 
founder had been a member of the People’s Liberation Army (Reuters, 24 August 2010). 
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February 2011: Blocking Huawei’s acquisition of US-firm 3Leaf Systems technology 
In May 2010, Huawei made a relatively small purchase at USD 2 million of assets from an 
insolvent U.S. server technology firm, 3Leaf Systems. It had sought and received approval for 
its acquisition of the U.S. firm’s technology from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS). However, the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) had 
not given its approval and requested the deal be sent for their review. Huawei argued that 
approval from BIS, an agency under the U.S. Department of Commerce, was sufficient to 
complete the deal. CFIUS consequently blocked the transaction, based on national security 
concerns, ordering Huawei to divest its acquired asset, and banning Huawei from hiring any 
of its employees (Reuters, 19 February 2011)  
October 2012: U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Intelligence’s report 
In October 2012, the U.S. House Representatives’ Select Committee on Intelligence published 
a report4 after investigating both Chinese telecommunications firms, Huawei and ZTE. In the 
committee’s report, it raised strong concerns over Huawei’s ownership structure, its loan 
scheme to its customers, its commercial relationship with Iran, and its continued suspicion on 
the firm’s ties to the Chinese government and military. However, the report failed to find any 
clear evidence of wrongdoings by Huawei. An 18-month investigation ordered by the White 
House also found no clear evidence of wrongdoings but highlighted the potential of a security 
issue  (Reuters, 17 October 2012). Both reports would serve as a cautious warning to U.S. 
firms considering collaborating with Huawei.  
January 2018: Political pressure for U.S. carrier to pull out of a partnership with Huawei 
In January 2018, Huawei was expected to announce its partnership with U.S. carrier AT&T to 
sell its smartphones in the U.S. market. However, following a letter from U.S. Senate and 
House Intelligence Committee members sent in December 2017 to the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commissions, raising concerns over the specific deal between Huawei and 
AT&T, the latter party chose to pull out from the deal (Reuters, 8 January 2018).  
 
4  The full title of the report is The Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese 
Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE. 
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December 2018: Huawei CFO arrested in Canada at the request of the U.S. government 
On 1 December 2018, Huawei’s CFO and daughter of founder Ren Zhengfei, Meng Wanzhou, 
was arrested at Vancouver International Airport at the request of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (Reuters, 5 December 2018). The U.S. charged Meng and Huawei over bank and wire 
fraud in violation of U.S. sanctions on Iran and requested her to be extradited to U.S. soil. The 
move has caused relations between China and Canada to deteriorate. During the time of arrest, 
U.S. and China were engaged in a trade war and in an interview with Reuters on 12 December 
2018, President Trump said he would be willing to intervene in Meng’s case if it would help 
his administration close a trade deal with China (Reuters, 12 December 2018). President 
Trump’s comment reinforced speculation that the arrest of Meng was politically motivated 
and used as a bargaining chip during the trade war between the U.S. and China.  
15 May 2019: U.S. firms barred from buying Huawei equipment while adding Huawei 
to the U.S. trade blacklist  
On 15 May 2019, President Trump issued an executive order declaring foreign adversaries’ 
threats in the information and communications technology and services supply chain a national 
emergency (White House, 2019). The move was seen as directed towards Huawei, as the 
executive order would bar U.S. firms from using telecommunication equipment made by firms 
deemed by the U.S. government as posing a national security risk. In a parallel move, the U.S. 
Commerce Department added Huawei and 70 affiliates to its Entity List – effectively banning 
the firm from buying any parts and components from U.S. firms unless given special-granted 
license from the government (Reuters, 16 May 2019). The move was a critical blow for 
Huawei, which relies heavily on U.S. semiconductors to produce its telecommunications 
equipment and smartphones. It also prompted Google to cut off future Huawei smartphones 
from receiving Android operating system updates and access services like Gmail and Google 
Play, putting Huawei smartphones at a significant disadvantage. 
May 2020: U.S. Commerce Department expands its restriction on Huawei’s ability to 
access U.S. technology 
On 15 May 2020, the U.S. Commerce Department further tightened its control on Huawei’s 
supply chain. It required any firm, both U.S. and non-US, who has had its products been 
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designed or made using US-produced technology or hardware, to require special license to be 
able to sell to Huawei (Reuters, 15 May 2020). The difference from the 15 May 2019 
restriction is that the first restriction only affected US-based firms.  The 15 May 2020 
restriction would also limit firms abroad who might have some U.S. technology in its product 
component mix to trade with Huawei. 
July 2020: U.S. State Department imposes travel ban on Huawei employees 
On 15 July, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the State Department would 
impose visa restrictions on “certain Huawei employees” under the allegations that they provide 
material support to the Chinese government to commit human rights abuses (Reuters, 15 july 
2020). The basis of the move was likely to be related to U.S. allegations that Huawei’s 
telecommunications equipment was being used in the Xinjiang province of China. In this 
province, the U.S. has accused China of abusing the human rights of one of the region’s ethnic 
minorities, the Uighurs. 
2018-2020: Exerting pressure on other nations to ban Huawei from their 5G roll-out 
The U.S.’ aggressive campaign against Huawei goes beyond its national borders. According 
to reports, U.S. officials have exerted pressure, scolded, and threatened other nations, against 
using Huawei in the roll-out of 5G networks in their respective nations (The New York Times, 
17 March 2019).  
One of the threats directed to some of the U.S.’ closest allies involved withholding intelligence 
sharing if the countries were to choose Huawei in their 5G networks. While the U.S.’ 
aggressive tactics initially were met by resistance from other nations, several nations have 
since eventually decided to formally ban the Chinese telecommunications firm, while other 
nations has imposed technical barriers to restrict Huawei from their markets. According to one 
report, the British government privately admitted to Huawei that it had switched its position 
from allowing Huawei to participate in building its 5G networks to banning it due to 
tremendous pressure from the U.S. government (Bloomberg, 18 July 2020).  
As of March 2021, countries besides the U.S. that has formally banned Huawei include 
Sweden, Australia, the U.K., Japan, Poland, and Romania. France. 
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3. The financial and economic impacts of Huawei 
restrictions  
This section will attempt to identify some of the financial and economic impacts of the punitive 
measures against Huawei by the U.S. government. It will focus on three different perspectives: 
the first one is the financial impact on Huawei itself, the second one is the financial impacts 
on some of Huawei's top suppliers, and the third one is on the economic impact on the 
European market. This section aims to highlight some of the important implications of U.S.'s 
campaign on Huawei following the series of punitive measures launched against the firm.  
3.1 The financial impact of the punitive measures on 
Huawei 
The punitive measures against Huawei have had both broad and severe reach on the Chinese 
telecom giant.  The series of punitive measures have first and foremost impacted Huawei's two 
main business areas: its consumer electronics business and its carrier network business.  
Source: (Huawei, 2020) 
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Together these two segments constituted the lion share of Huawei's total revenue5 of USD 123 
billion: its consumer business's revenue was at USD 66.5 billion. Its carrier network business's 
revenue was at USD 42.7 billion in 2019 (Huawei, 2020). 
Huawei's consumer business was severely affected when the firm was added to the U.S. entity 
list on 15 May 2019. A few days later, a Google spokesperson revealed that the firm would 
suspend its business operations with Huawei to comply with the U.S. government's imposed 
restrictions (Reuters, 19 May 2019). Following that decision, Huawei smartphones were no 
longer able to access updates on its Android operating system. Huawei's next version 
smartphones would no longer have access to Google Play Store and Google applications such 
as Google Maps and Gmail. Lack of such applications put Huawei's smartphones at a 
considerable competitive disadvantage compared to its main competitors, and many 
consumers were expected to switch to other smartphone brands that did not have these 
restrictions. Shortly after, many phone carriers discarded their plans to sell Huawei 
smartphones, as estimated demand for the phones plummeted.  
Huawei estimated that the trade blacklisting would reduce the firm's sales by over USD30 
billion over the next two years, and a 40% decline in smartphone sales outside China in 2019 
(Bloomberg, 16 June 2019). This represented a loss of sale of 40-60 million smartphone units, 
a substantial share of its total 206 million shipped smartphone units in 2019. In the first quarter 
of 2020, Huawei's smartphone shipments outside China dropped by 35%. While this was 
during a period of slow global demand for smartphones due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
drop in shipment was twice and four times larger than the decline of its rivals Samsung and 
Apple, respectively (Strumpf, 2020), and industry analysts expect Huawei's smartphone 
business to continue to decline by 60-70% in 2021 (Nikkei, 23 October 2020). 
Huawei's carrier network business is also expected to decline overseas, as the U.S. government 
has successfully pressured some of its allies to exclude Huawei from its 5G networks. Huawei 
was the global leader of 4G networks; however, following recent geopolitical development, 
its market share in Europe and Australia is expected to drop significantly following potential 
bans from Western markets. Huawei's main competitors, Nokia and Ericsson, is expected to 
 
5 Converted from Chinese Yuan (CNY) to United States dollar (USD) using the closing exchange rate at the end of 2019 of 
USD1.00 = CNY6.9840 
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overtake Huawei's market share, and Nokia reported in June 2019 that it had surpassed Huawei 
in the number of commercial orders on 5G telecom equipment with 52 orders, compared to 
Huawei's 50 orders (Reuters, 3 June 2019).  
While there are few estimates of these 5G commercial orders' value, it is expected to take a 
considerable portion off Huawei's USD 42.3 billion carrier network business and slow its 
future growth opportunities drastically.  
The punitive measures have also impacted Huawei by severely disrupting its supply chain. 
The export restrictions set by the U.S. government has limited Huawei's ability to access 
critical components for most of its products, in particular semiconductors, which are essential 
for the functioning of Huawei's main products, i.e., telecommunications hardware, 
smartphones, tablets, and laptops.   
While Huawei initially reacted to the export restrictions by stockpiling semiconductors before 
the restriction went into effect (Bloomberg, 22 October 2020), these stockpiles will eventually 
become depleted. Without the supply of semiconductors, and while not currently able to 
produce its own, Huawei will struggle to manufacture most of its products and cripple its 
ability to manufacture smartphones and telecommunications equipment – its two main 
business segments. This is likely to have an enormous financial impact on Huawei, as its 
ability to generate revenue is severely threatened.  
The combined effects of Huawei's severely limited access to critical inputs for their 
smartphones and the lack of access of Google's Android software was likely the reason for 
Huawei's decision to sell its budget smartphone brand Honor. In the official announcement, 
Huawei stated that its consumer business had been “under tremendous pressure […] due to a 
persistent unavailability of technical elements needed for [its] mobile phone business" 
(Huawei, 2020). After the sale, Honor was expected to be released from any U.S. restrictions.  
Some industry analysts also believe that the decision was motivated to raise cash that it would 
use to invest in its own chip-making technology, as the U.S.'s restrictions have forced the firm 
to become more self-reliant (BBC, 17 November 2020). In November 2020, Huawei was 
reported to be working on plans for a chip plant in Shanghai that would avoid any usage of 
U.S. technology in its component mix (Financial Times, 1 November 2020). This move will 
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come at an incredibly high cost for the firm, as semiconductor manufacturing requires one of 
the highest R&D and capital expenditures by any industry (Bown, 2020).  
Additionally, Huawei has also suffered significant reputational damage following the U.S.'s 
campaign against the firm. Media coverage on Huawei has primarily focused on U.S.'s security 
and espionage allegations, which is likely to deter many consumers who otherwise would be 
favourable to using Huawei products from purchasing them.   
3.2 The financial impact of the punitive measures on 
Huawei's suppliers 
As one of the world's largest telecommunication equipment providers and smartphone 
manufacturers, Huawei has been an important customer to many of its suppliers. Recalling 
from Chapter 2.2, when the U.S. government added Huawei on the U.S. entity list on 19 May 
2019, it prohibited U.S. firms from selling products or services to Huawei without a 
government-designated license. While the move targeted Huawei in an attempt to cripple its 
ability to produce 5G equipment, on the other side were many U.S. firms who no longer could 
sell their products or services to Huawei.  
Following the announcement that Huawei would be placed on the U.S. entity list, many U.S. 
suppliers reduced their financial forecasts to adjust to the announced export restrictions. A 
report by investment bank Goldman Sachs identified Huawei's key U.S. suppliers and 
estimated the sales revenue those suppliers derived from Huawei in the third fiscal quarter of 
2018 (Reuters, 16 May 2019). The report also estimated the exposure each supplier had to 
Huawei by calculating each suppliers' sales revenue to Huawei in relation to each suppliers' 
total revenue. It found more than eight U.S. firms to derive 5 per cent or more from Huawei 
in the third fiscal quarter of 2018, with one supplier, NeoPhotonics, deriving almost half of its 
total revenue from the Chinese telecom giant.  
In Table 1, the estimates from the Goldman Sachs report are reproduced to illustrate how 
Huawei's largest U.S. suppliers might be affected by the export restrictions imposed by the 
U.S. government. Although their sales revenues from Huawei are considerable in dollar terms, 
some larger firms might have less exposure due to their sheer size. On the other hand, smaller 
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firms are likely more affected as their percentage of sales revenue from Huawei is significant 
compared to their total sales revenue.  
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NeoPhotonics Optoelectronic products 252 47 
Qorvo Radio-frequency systems 651 11 
Lumentum Optical and photonic products 223 11 
II-VI Optical devices, semiconductors 165 8 
Broadcom Semiconductors, infrastructure 
software 
2 090 6 
Skyworks Semiconductors (radio frequency 
and mobile communication 
systems) 
441 6 
Qualcomm Telecom equipment, 
semiconductors 
1 580 5 
Flex Electronics manufacturing, original 
design manufacturing 
2 430 5 
Seagate Technology Computer storage products 829 4 
Maxim Integrated Semiconductors (analog and 
mixed-signal integrated circuits) 
149 4 
Analog Devices Analog, mixed-signal and DSP 
integrated circuits 
338 3 
Marvell Technology Integrated circuits 120 3 
Micron Technology Computer memory, data storage 768 2 
Corning Glass and ceramics materials 369 2 
Advanced Micro Devices Computer processors  268 2 
CommScope Network infrastructure products 188 2 
Keysight Technology Electronic design and test solutions 128 2 
Intel Semiconductors  589 1 
Western Digital Hard disk drives, storage systems 256 1 
Microsoft Software 190 <1 
Source: (Reuters, 16 May 2019) with data collected by Goldman Sachs  
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The figures in Table 1 do not necessarily accurately represent the financial impact on the U.S. 
suppliers. It is important to recall that some firms might be able to obtain a special license 
from the U.S. Commerce Department to still supply to Huawei. Reports reveal that some firms 
were successful in applying for these licenses, particularly firms that supply less-sophisticated 
technology products that are not related to 5G technology.  
Granting some suppliers a special license would reduce the financial impact of the export 
restrictions on Huawei. However, later reports indicate that the U.S. Commerce Department 
revoked certain licenses from firms who were previously permitted to do business with 
Huawei, forcing them to forego sales revenue from Huawei (Reuters, 17 January 2021). 
In the short run, Huawei's stockpiling efforts between the announcement of the export 
restrictions and the time these restrictions went into effect (90 days) would also reduce the 
suppliers' financial impact, as some suppliers experienced a surge in demand from Huawei.  
U.S. export restrictions also impacted non-U.S. suppliers; initially, the U.S. export restrictions 
forced Huawei to seek suppliers outside the U.S. and did so in firms domiciled in South Korea 
and Taiwan. But after the Trump administration reinforced its export restriction in May 2020 
to also include non-U.S. firms who used any U.S. technology in their component mix, many 
foreign firms were also impacted by this reinforced export restriction.  As the U.S. is the 
world's leading semiconductor designer, the new restrictions inflicted had a significant 
financial impact on Huawei's non-U.S. suppliers as well. One impacted supplier is Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing (TSMC), the world's largest contract chip manufacturer, who 
stopped taking new orders from Huawei since the Trump Administration's decision in 2020 
(The Wall Street Journal, 16 July 2020). In 2019, Huawei was estimated to account for 15-
20% of TSMC's total revenue of approximately USD 35 billion.  
The real financial impact to Huawei's suppliers is difficult to estimate and will depend on 
several factors such as each firm's dependency to Huawei, each firm's ability to find alternative 
revenue sources, and the U.S. Commerce Department's willingness to approve special 
licenses. However, it is clear that the imposed export restrictions have created enormous 
uncertainty, unpredictability and significant loss of revenue to both U.S. and non-U.S. 
businesses as a consequence of the U.S. government's campaign against Huawei. 
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3.3 The economic impact on Europe of restricting Huawei 
from its 5G networks 
In the previous parts, the focus was on the financial impact on Huawei and its suppliers, 
resulting from different punitive measures, particularly the export restrictions. In this part, the 
focus turns towards the economic impact of restricting Huawei from certain markets, here 
exemplified by the European market.   
In a study by Oxford Economics, the British research agency estimated the costs of restricting 
Huawei from the 5G networks across 31 European countries, E.U.'s 27 countries in addition 
to the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland (Oxford Economics, 2020). By 
combining a theoretical model of oligopoly, merger simulation techniques and empirical 
evidence, the study estimates that restricting Huawei from the European market will increase 
the annual cost of building 5G networks by 19%, which equates to almost EUR 3 billion per 
year over the next decade.  
The study also estimates that restricting Huawei from the 5G networks competition will delay 
56 million European users' 5G access by 2023. With a delayed rollout in 5G, the study also 
estimates that the reduced 5G access will cause a reduction in technological innovations and 
economic growth that will lead to an aggregate GDP reduction of an of EUR 40 billion (in 
2020 prices) across the 31 European countries in 2035.  A summary of country-by-country 
data is reproduced in Table 2. 
 
While there are few similar studies, some governments have tried to make similar estimates 
for their respective countries. The U.K.'s National Cyber Security Centre made an analysis 
where it found that excluding Huawei from the sensitive part of the "core" network would cost 
the country roughly GBP 1.5 billion and delay the rollout of 5G networks by one year. A full 
ban of Huawei equipment from the U.K. market, which the U.K. has decided upon as of 
January 2021, will incur even higher costs and delays in the rollout and seem consistent with 
the estimates the study by Oxford Economics. 
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Table 2 The Impact of restricting Huawei from the European 5G-rollout 
    
 Country 
Increased avg. annual 
investment cost 
(EUR million) 
Number of people with 
delayed access to 5G 
(thousands) 
Permanent loss of GDP 
(EUR million) 
Austria 73 1 100 1,100 
Belgium 65 1 700 1,100 
Bulgaria 20 700 100 
Croatia 23 200 80 
Cyprus 7 38 40 
Czech Rep. 57 1 200 400 
Denmark 29 800 600 
Estonia 10 130 60 
Finland 79 600 400 
France 447 4 000 7,300 
Germany 479 11 900 6,900 
Greece 37 800 600 
Hungary 55 500 300 
Iceland 3 20 13 
Ireland 27 345 700 
Italy 283 6 900 4,700 
Latvia 8 180 70 
Lithuania 8 200 60 
Luxembourg 5 50 130 
Malta 4 20 40 
Netherlands 52 2 100 1,600 
Norway 98 600 1,100 
Poland 120 3 300 1,000 
Portugal 63 1 000 500 
Romania 59 2 400 80 
Slovakia 31 200 200 
Slovenia 15 120 150 
Spain 292 5 000 3,700 
Sweden 64 1 400 1,100 
Switzerland 94 800 1,700 
UK 374 7 300 4,400 
Total 2 908 55 603 40 223 
Source: Oxford Economics (2020) 
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The study did not consider the costs of replacing Huawei equipment in already existing mobile 
networks in Europe. There are limited studies on the costs associated with those actions, so-
called "rip-and-replace", but the U.K.'s largest provider of broadband and mobile services 
estimates that it will cost them GBP 500 million to restrict Huawei from its networks. As 
Huawei has been one of the main equipment providers of the 4G networks in Europe, similar 
rip-and-replace costs are likely to incur for other countries. However, the actual costs will 
depend on the scale of telecommunications equipment needed to be removed and replaced is.  
While Oxford Economics’ study is a comprehensive one, it is still a hypothetical scenario that 
assumes that Huawei is entirely restricted from the European 5G market. Although some 
European governments have signalled a full ban on Huawei network equipment, it is doubtful 
that Huawei is completely restricted from the entire European market.  
In January 2020, the European Union published a set of recommendations for its 27 member 
states with guidelines on restricting or excluding "high-risk 5G vendors" from core parts of 
their telecommunications networks (European Commission, 2020). Still, the final decision of 
whether to restrict or not and the degree of restriction is at the discretion of each member 
state's government. Therefore, the study's estimated costs are not necessarily a plausible 
representation of the actual costs that would incur. The economic impact is likely to be lower 
than the estimates indicate. However, the study is useful in understanding the effects that such 
restrictions cause. 
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4. Further implications of the punitive measures 
against Huawei 
The previous chapter found high financial and economic costs associated with the punitive 
measures against Huawei. From the loss of sales revenue for Huawei and its suppliers on a 
firm-level perspective to GDP loss from reduced competition in the European market and 
delayed access to 5G usage. This part will discuss further implications beyond the financial 
and economic impacts that have arisen or might arise from the punitive measures against 
Huawei.  
4.1 Disruptions in the global value chains 
In the early months of 2021, automakers announced a sharp cut in their production output 
following a shortage in semiconductors. One industry analyst estimates that the shortage will 
reduce the global automotive industry's revenue by USD 110 billion in 2021 due to the lack 
of semiconductor components (CNBC, 14 May 2021). Semiconductors are crucial for 
advanced features in cars such as collision warning sensors or self-driving capabilities through 
LiDAR technology, but also basic features such as power steering and brake systems.  
There were several causes of the semiconductor shortage in the automotive industry. The 
primary cause was the COVID-19 pandemic that shocked global markets in 2020. Firstly, 
many automakers temporarily shut down their factories for two months to reduce the spread 
of the COVID-19 virus. Many automakers also voluntarily cut back production and cancelled 
purchase orders of semiconductors as they expected consumer spending to drop due to the 
expected economic fallout from the pandemic.  
Secondly, semiconductor manufacturers quickly shifted their supply to the electronics 
industry, which experienced a massive surge in demand. As many countries imposed 
lockdowns or encouraged workers to work from home, the demand for electronic equipment 
such as desktops, laptops, monitors and other communication gadgets grew exponentially to 
facilitate the shift to telecommuting and online learning. When automakers were experiencing 
higher demand than initially expected, the semiconductor manufacturers had already reached 
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their maximum production capacity. Therefore, they could not meet the automakers' demand, 
which led to a severe decline in automobile production (The Washington Post, 1 March 2021).  
Another cause comes from several ripple effects of several of the US punitive measures 
discussed earlier. One of them was the punitive measure against Semiconductor 
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC).  
In September 2020, the US Commerce Department notified U.S. firms that they would no 
longer be allowed to sell their equipment, designs, and software to SMIC before adding the 
Chinese semiconductor manufacturer to the US entity list on 18 December 2020. The move 
attempted to cripple SMIC's ability to manufacture its semiconductors, especially its most 
advanced ones. In 2020, SMIC had an estimated 5% market share in the semiconductor 
manufacturing market (TrendForce, 2020) and about 10% market share in older-generation 
semiconductors (Financial Times, 27 September 2020).  
When the US government targeted SMIC, it prohibited US semiconductor firms from trading 
with SMIC and caused clients of SMIC, including some automakers, to re-evaluate their 
exposure to SMIC as concerns about its ability to manufacture its semiconductors grew. 
Following such re-evaluations, several firms diversified their supply chains away from SMIC 
and into Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). However, as TSMC 
already operated at maximum production capacity due to the surge in consumer electronics, it 
could not meet the extra demand (Reuters, 15 January 2021). The additional pressure towards 
TSMC's production capabilities, which is estimated to manufacture 54% of the global supply 
of semiconductors (TrendForce, 2020), further intensified the global semiconductor shortage 
that was already evident.  
A second ripple effect comes from the punitive measures against Huawei. Recalling from 
Chapter 3.1, when the US Commerce Department added Huawei to the US entity list in May 
2019, one of Huawei's responses was to stockpile semiconductors, including from one of 
Huawei's main suppliers, TSMC. Huawei has not been the only Chinese firm stockpiling; 
several Chinese tech firms have also been stockpiling semiconductors either due to being 
designated by a US export restriction or in anticipation of such measure. According to official 
trade data gathered by Bloomberg (2 February 2021), China's imports of semiconductors 
reached USD380 billion in 2020 and accounted for 18% of China's total imports that year, 
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compared to USD300 billion the previous year (Reuters, 26 August 2020). The stockpiling 
efforts have increased the pressure on the global semiconductor manufacturers, further 
intensifying the semiconductor shortage.  
A third ripple effect also comes from the punitive measures against Huawei but from another 
perspective. Recalling from Chapter 2.2, when Huawei was no longer able to access its key 
suppliers, it severely reduced its ability to produce its consumer electronics and reduced the 
consumer demand for especially its series of smartphones (following the loss of the Android 
operating system). Following the punitive measures against Huawei, many of Huawei's 
competitors sought to capture parts of the global market share that Huawei was expected to 
lose. Therefore, several smartphone makers increased their production capabilities, which also 
meant increasing their purchase of semiconductors. One of them was the Chinese smartphone 
maker Xiaomi, which increased its spending on semiconductors by 26% compared to the 
previous year (Gartner, 2021), which again added pressure on semiconductor manufacturers 
and further tightened the global semiconductor shortage.  
The COVID-19 pandemic was the main immediate cause of the global shortage of 
semiconductors; however, the ripple effects of the US punitive measures against firms like 
Huawei and SMIC further exacerbated the pressure on the global semiconductor supply. This 
highlights how punitive measures do not unfold themselves in a vacuum between the 
designating government and the targeted firm, as participants in the global value chains 
reassess their positions while facing an unpredictable business environment. 
4.2 Design-out of U.S. technology 
The U.S. government has continuously argued that its punitive measures against Huawei have 
been necessary to protect its national security. Critics argue that these unilateral measures have 
weakened the U.S. credibility as a reliable trading partner. Consequently, foreign firms might 
perceive a heightened risk of relying on U.S. technology, especially those that involve 
advanced technology such as semiconductors. That has been the concern of the U.S.'s 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Association (SEMI), who represents more than 2,400 
member companies. In a statement, SEMI  expressed that the "restriction [would] fuel a 
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perception that the supply of U.S. technology is unreliable and would lead non-U.S. customers 
to call for the design-out of U.S. technology" (SEMI, 2020). 
The design-out of U.S. technology, which can be understood as the process of phasing out 
U.S. technology from one's supply chain, might indeed be an implication of the punitive 
measures against Huawei. Not only for Huawei, whose supply was forcibly cut off, and has 
already developed its own operating system and plans to build its own semiconductor plant, 
but other Chinese firms are likely to be deterred from relying on U.S. technology and thus 
might start phasing out U.S. technology and components from their supply chains.  
Additionally, other foreign firms, such as European ones, which are not likely targets of U.S. 
punitive measures, might want to replace U.S. technology and components with non-U.S. 
alternatives to avoid being forced to stop supplying to Chinese firms. According to one report 
(Financial Times, 23 December 2020), European technology executives and diplomats have 
grown increasingly frustrated over U.S.'s unilateral measures against certain Chinese firms, 
such as Huawei, because it unwillingly could no longer supply to those firms. According to 
one source, this has accelerated European efforts to be less dependent on U.S. technology and 
might be one of the motivations for the European Commission's December 2020 
announcement of a "European initiative on processors and semiconductor technology", with 
plans on using EUR 145 billion on digital transition projects, including semiconductor 
research. 
The U.S.'s tight export controls on semiconductors have led RISC-V, a non-profit organisation 
that promotes open and free semiconductor chip instruction sets to relocate its headquarters 
and intellectual properties from the U.S. to Switzerland. The organisation, which is composed 
of more than 325 firms and entities, including U.S., European and Chinese chip suppliers and 
universities, made the decision after growing concerns among its non-U.S. members over 
possible geopolitical disruption, a reference to the U.S.'s export controls (Reuters, 25 
November 2019).  
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4.3 Strive for self-reliance 
From a short-run perspective, the U.S.' efforts towards restricting Chinese firms from 
accessing advanced semiconductor technology have been partially successful in its objective. 
Huawei has been struggling to source advanced semiconductors needed in its production, 
which has damaged its position as a leading telecommunication equipment provider. However, 
as Huawei has attempted to resolve some of the challenges through investing heavily in its 
R&D and trying to develop its own advanced semiconductors, other Chinese technology firms 
who have been affected by similar punitive measures have also shifted their expenditure to 
heavily focus on R&D towards the development of advanced semiconductors and other high-
tech components. It has also accelerated China's national effort towards becoming more self-
reliant in critical technologies, with a particular focus on boosting the nation's semiconductor 
abilities (The New York Times, 24 December 2020).  
The implication of severely restricting Chinese firms access to advanced semiconductor 
technology has therefore pushed China and other countries' drive for greater technological 
self-reliance. This may eventually hurt U.S. long-term national security interests, as it 
increases the risk of U.S. semiconductor capabilities being surpassed by other countries and 
risk losing control and lead of this strategically important technology.  
To illustrate the possible implications of restricting one country's access to a strategically 
important technology, one can look at the case of the cooperative project between EU and 
China on satellite technology. In September 2003, the EU invited China to jointly fund and 
develop a common satellite system, called the Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System 
(European Commission, 2003). China invested EUR 200 million in the joint initiative, which 
was set out to reduce both region's reliance on the widely used U.S. government-owned 
satellite system, the Global Positioning System (GPS). From the Chinese side, the motivation 
to join this collaboration was further motivated by the U.S. blocking of China's access to its 
satellite technology. As with semiconductor technology, satellite technology would also have 
civilian and military applications, which made the technology strategically even more 
important for both the EU and China.  
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The EU-China collaboration on the satellite system broke down in 2007. According to released 
U.S. diplomatic cables6, U.S. diplomats and officials had been urging European governments 
and aerospace firms to withhold sensitive technology from China due to security concerns 
(Reuters, 22 December 2013). There was also disagreement on the initial funding plan between 
China and the EU, and internally between different EU member states.  
Undeterred by the setback, China made it a strategic priority to continue to develop its own 
satellite system, which was named Beidou Global Navigation Satellite System, and invested 
heavily into the project. While the European satellite system's funding and progress faltered, 
the Chinese counterpart managed to develop its own satellite components and completed the 
system in three phases: an experimental phase in 2000-2003, a national and regional coverage 
phase in 2012, and finally, a global coverage phase in 2020.  
The Beidou satellite system enjoyed first-mover advantages as it was able to secure more 
favourable signal frequencies at the Galileo system's expense. As of 2020, the Beidou system 
has an estimated accuracy of 1 meter for public use, while the older GPS system has an 
estimated 4.9-meter accuracy (Peng, 2020).  
The example of China's development of the Beidou Satellite System, though not as wide-
ranging as the current semiconductor conflict, demonstrates that short-term coercive measures 
may lead to technological independence for the receiver of punitive measure.  It might end up 
losing more control of the technology than before the restrictions and increase the risk of 
eventually being technologically surpassed by other countries, which would not serve the 
U.S.'s long-term national security and economic interests. Therefore, the U.S. government's 
punitive measures against Chinese firms may therefore yield tactical success in the short-run 
but end up as strategic setback in the long-run.  
  
 
6 These diplomatic cables, of highly confidential nature, were released by Wikileaks, an international non-profit organisation 
publishing classified information, news leaks and classified media provided by anonymous sources. 
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5. Common U.S. punitive measures 
In the previous chapters, the focus has been on the implications of the U.S. punitive measures 
specifically targeting Huawei.  In this chapter, the scope broadens beyond Huawei, and seeks 
to identify and understand on a more general basis, the U.S. government’s arsenal of punitive 
measures against foreign firms.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
5.1 CFIUS Reviews 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagency 
committee composed of nine powerful agencies of the U.S. government. Headed by the U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury, its members also include representative from the Departments of 
State, Defence, Homeland Security, and Energy, the Attorney General, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, n.d.) Its purpose is to serve the U.S. president in “overseeing the 
national security implications of foreign investment in the economy” (Jackson, 2020, p. 1) 
CFIUS was originally established in 1975 as a reporting and monitoring committee by 
President Gerald Ford as a response to growing concerns over increasing OPEC investments. 
Members of the U.S. congress feared that foreign firms that were controlled or influenced by 
the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could gain leverage over U.S. oil 
supplies through their investments in the United States. 
Initially, both its jurisdiction and activity were limited, but it has since developed into a 
“formidable force with the power to review and investigate foreign investments” (Westbrook, 
2019, p. 634). Now, with the president’s authority, the committee can “block or suspend 
proposed or pending foreign mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers of U.S. entities, including 
through joint ventures, that threaten to impair the national security [of the United States]” 
(Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 1). The committee has also retroactively prohibited 
already completed acquisition and forced foreign firms to divest its U.S. assets.  
On 13 August 2018, President Trump signed into law the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018 (Caine, Franceski, & Rosenberg, 2018). The law came 
as a response to concerns that the existing U.S. technological leadership’s ability to support 
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U.S.’ “national defence and economic security” was at risk due to increasing foreign direct 
investments, particularly by Chinese firms, into U.S. high tech firms. 
The new law has updated CFIUS procedures to formally and specifically also include reviews 
on any “non-controlling investment in certain U.S. business involved in critical technology, 
infrastructure, or personal data” (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 1). 
FIRRMA also allows for CFIUS to “potentially discriminate among foreign investors by 
country of origin and transactions tied to certain countries in reviewing certain investment 
transactions”  (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 1). Although it does not disclose 
which specific countries that face discriminatory reviews, it is reasonable to assume that close 
allies of the United States are not included. At the same time, geopolitical rivals such as China 
and Russia are likely to be prone to such reviews.  
Some legal professionals and scholars have criticised CFIUS for the committee’s secretive 
nature and its lack of transparency regarding how it operates and how it justifies its decisions 
(Broadman, 2019). There are minimal ways to challenge a CFIUS decision – once CFIUS 
decides to block a transaction, “[it] has so far proven impossible to overcome” (Westbrook, 
2019, p. 649).  
How exactly can a CFIUS review be used to target a foreign firm? A recent high-profile case 
involving one of the world’s most popular social apps, TikTok, can serve to illustrate. On 14 
August 2020, President Trump issued an executive order for ByteDance Ltd., a Chinese 
multinational tech firm headquartered in Beijing and developer of the video-sharing service 
TikTok, to divest its U.S. assets and property (The White House, 2020). ByteDance Ltd. had 
in 2017 acquired another Chinese-based firm, Musical.ly, which had a well-established footing 
in the U.S. market, and rebranded it into TikTok. Failure to comply with the order would lead 
to a ban of the app, prohibiting any U.S. transactions and removing the app from the U.S. 
market.  
Divestiture orders are traditionally mostly used in antitrust cases to deter a dominant firm from 
exploiting its position for market competition purposes. However, in CFIUS reviews, national 
security concerns is used to serve as a basis for divestiture orders. The app had about 100 
million monthly active U.S. users in August 2020 (CNBC, 24 August 2020), and according to 
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the Executive Order, the user data on those American users posed a national security threat to 
the United States because it could end up at the Chinese government’s. The tech firm rebutted 
that the allegations that the user data poses a national security threat, arguing that its servers 
and data maintained in the United States.   
In September 2020, following President Trump’s divestiture order, ByteDance had reached an 
agreement with the American technology firm Oracle Corporation and American retail 
corporation, Walmart for a significant stake in its U.S. operations (The Wall Street Journal, 
19 September 2020). As of February 2021, the agreement had not yet formally been approved 
by the White House.  
The TikTok case is noteworthy because it illustrates how foreign firms that operate in the U.S. 
and collect data on its users can be deemed a national security threat, and subsequently targeted 
of punitive measures by the U.S. government. Huang and Madnick (2020) point out that the 
data that TikTok collects is significantly less than what most U.S. tech firms, banks, credit 
agencies, and hotels collect. Therefore, it is not only tech firms such as Huawei and TikTok, 
that are susceptible to be targeted by this kind of measure. Seemingly, any firm that possesses 
any kind of user data may be subject to this punitive measure.  
As Huang and Madnick (2020) has found in their research, restrictions have been imposed on 
“medical devices, videoconference services, software products, security software, social 
media, security cameras, banking I.T. systems, drones, smartphones, smart toys, online 
content services, satellite communications, A.I. software, and financial services (…)”. With 
the growing usage of Big Data and the Internet of Things, an increasing number of firms in a 
wide variety of industries are likely to collect user data that could eventually deem them a 
national security threat. Thus, also increasing the risk of being susceptible to this punitive 
measure.  
5.2 U.S. Sanctions enforcement actions 
The United States is renowned for its extensive use of sanctions and imposes sanctions more 
than any other country (Masters, 2019). As of August 2020, it has over 8,000 sanctions in 
place (Zakaria, 2020) through over 30 active sanctions programmes (U.S. Department of the 
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Treasury, u.d.). Examples of active sanction programmes are ‘Cuba Sanctions’, ‘Foreign 
Interference in a United States Election Sanctions’, ‘Hong Kong-Related Sanctions’, ‘Global 
Magnitsky Sanctions’, ‘Iran Sanctions’ and ‘North Korea Sanctions’.  
U.S. sanctions generally apply to U.S. parties, but the U.S. government has in recent years 
practised aggressive extraterritorial enforcement of their sanctions (Townsend, 2020). 
Therefore, the U.S. sanctions also pose a significant risk to foreign firms without US-presence 
who otherwise operates internationally.  
U.S. sanctions are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) within the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and in conjunction with U.S. State Department and other 
relevant agencies (McVey, 2019). U.S. sanctions are regulated through an increasingly 
complex and changing legal landscape. The main statutory authority for U.S. sanctions 
includes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies 
Act and are typically imposed through the issue of an Executive Order by the U.S. President.   
Primary sanctions 
U.S. sanctions are either primary or secondary sanctions. Primary sanctions generally apply to 
(1) all entities organised in the U.S.; (2) U.S. citizens and permanent residents; and (3) all 
persons physically located in the U.S., regardless of nationality (collectively called ‘U.S. 
persons’). Legal professionals often refer to this as having a U.S. nexus, and any firm having 
a U.S. nexus can be held liable if they violate U.S. sanctions laws, e.g., most dealings involving 
sanctioned countries such as Iran, Cuba, Syria, North Korea, and sanctioned persons, i.e., 
organisations or individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List 
(SDN List), or sanctioned activities, e.g., activities involving certain parts of Russia’s energy 
sector.  
Primary sanctions are meant to directly deter U.S. entities from dealings with countries, 
persons or activities that are not aligned with U.S. interests. What is notable is that the 
definition of U.S. entities is relatively broad, and thus can be applied to foreign parties who 
have a physical presence within the U.S., and foreign firms without a physical presence within 
the U.S., but who have “board members, directors, or employees who hold U.S. citizenship or 
U.S. green cards” (Townsend, 2020). 
 




Secondary sanctions are sanctions that do not require a U.S. nexus. Through these sanctions, 
the OFAC can impose sanctions on foreign persons that do not have a direct connection to the 
United States but is involved with U.S. sanction targets (Townsend, 2020).  
Foreign firms can become subject to U.S. sanction laws if there is “sufficient level of contacts 
with the United States” (McVey, 2019, p. 4). If a foreign firm engages in transactions 
involving a U.S. person or a U.S. product, technology, or service, or has a U.S. presence, the 
firm can be subjected to the U.S. sanctions programme. While this suggests a close link to the 
U.S., OFAC has opted for a broad interpretation of what this entails. 
Through its enforcement, OFAC has established that if a foreign firm engages in business 
transactions outside U.S. jurisdiction but with the use of U.S. dollars, it is deemed as using the 
U.S. financial system and therefore is subject to U.S. sanction laws.  
It has also established that if a foreign firm has previously filed for bankruptcy in a U.S. 
bankruptcy court, it is also subject to U.S. sanction laws even though it is not engaged in 
transactions involving U.S. parties or products.  
OFAC has also enforced U.S. sanctions on a foreign firm by alleging that the firm has 
purchased American components and incorporated into its product, before selling to a country 
sanctioned by the U.S.  
Additionally, OFAC has targeted foreign parties who have no contact or link to the U.S., but 
whom it finds to engage in activity that is not aligned to U.S. policy goals (McVey, 2019). An 
example of this was when OFAC on 6 April 2018, added 38 Russian parties on its SDN List 
under its sanctions on Russia and Crimea (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2018). Among 
the 38 parties were business executives, firms that were owned or controlled by those 
executives, government officials and a bank.  
It is also noteworthy that OFAC operates under a so-called “50% rule”, whereas if a firm is 
owned 50% or more by an entity on the SDN List, they are also considered to be on the list. 
The designation of parties on the SDN List is a non-public process and is not required to follow 
any criminal or civil legal procedure. Severe restrictions were imposed on the parties on the 
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list, including assets freeze and travel bans. Severe restrictions were imposed on the parties on 
the list, including assets freeze and travel bans.  
While the SDN List is a relatively extreme measure, foreign firms who are not on the SDN 
List, but conducts business with an SDN List party, would also become at risk of being 
targeted by OFAC for violating U.S. sanctions. OFAC has established that providing “material 
assistance” to others in violating its sanctions laws makes the assisting party also subject to its 
sanctions.  It has also perhaps deliberately not clarified on what “material assistance” entails, 
thus giving OFAC wide access to decide whether another party is violating its jurisdiction.   
5.3 FCPA enforcement actions 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) is a U.S. statue that criminalises the bribery of 
foreign officials anywhere in the world by firms subject to its provisions. FCPA was signed 
into law by President Jimmy Carter in 1977 and was initially intended to target U.S. firms 
operating abroad, following numerous reports finding U.S. firms to “[making] millions of 
dollars of questionable payments to foreign government officials to secure business […]” 
(Diamant, Sullivan, & Smith, 2019, p. 356). Although FCPA enforcement levels were low the 
first decades after it was introduced, U.S. firms heavily criticised the statue for putting U.S. 
firms at a competitive disadvantage, arguing that U.S. firms effectively had to comply with 
higher anti-corruption standards than many of their foreign competitors, who did not face 
similar provisions or enforcement regimes in their home countries   
In 1998, the FCPA was amended to address the concerns that U.S. firms had raised regarding 
the competitive disparity to foreign competitors, and FCPA’s jurisdictional reach thus was 
extended to include foreign firms and persons acting within U.S. territory (Brown, 2001). 
FCPA provisions are enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Like OFAC, the DOJ and SEC have opted for a wide 
interpretation of its provisions to give them an extraterritorial reach.  
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For example, in 2006 and 2008 respectively, German conglomerate Siemens AG and the 
Norwegian state-owned petroleum giant Statoil ASA7 were found to be held under FCPA 
jurisdiction because both firms were listed on the NYSE through American Depositary Receipt 
(ADR). Both firms were charged under FCPA provisions for paying bribes in other countries, 
though it was not directly an American branch or subsidiary of the firms involved (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008; Department of Justice, 2009).  
FCPA provisions also have jurisdiction when foreign firms use U.S. banks or the U.S. banking 
system. In one case, a Japanese firm was found to violate FCPA provisions when it bribed a 
Nigerian government official by wiring from a Dutch bank account to a Swiss bank account 
through a New York correspondent account (Diamant et al., 2019). Therefore, although 
transactions were made through two non-U.S. banks, because there was a U.S. element 
through the U.S. correspondent bank, the U.S. authorities found it could enforce FCPA 
provisions.  
The DOJ has also established that a foreign firm can be held liable to FCPA provisions if an 
email used to conspire to foreign corruption passes through U.S. email servers. This was the 
case when a Hungarian telecommunications firm had sent an email to a foreign official, 
allegedly as part of the bribery scheme, and the email had passed through U.S. email servers 
(Mirenda & Smith, 2013). In another case, the DOJ held a Chinese firm liable to FCPA 
provisions because the Chinese firm had approved a budget with improper payment amounts 
via emails sent to an employee working in the U.S.  
While the FCPA Act was originally intended to deter U.S. firms from paying bribes to foreign 
officials, in recent years, it has aggressively been used on foreign firms. Diamant et al. (2019) 
find that foreign firms fare far worse under FCPA provisions than U.S. firms. While the DOJ 
and the SEC in absolute terms have brought more enforcement actions against U.S.-firms, 
when looking at average costs to resolve FCPA enforcement actions, foreign firms had four 
times higher average costs than U.S. firms. In 2017, foreign firms paid on average USD 150 
million in settlements, while US-firms on average was significantly less, at USD 16.1 million. 
 
7 In 2018, Statoil ASA changed its name and now goes under the name Equinor ASA. 
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This suggests that the U.S. government imposes discriminatory enforcement of FCPA 
violations to foreign firms’ disadvantage.  
5.4 Trade blacklisting: the U.S. entity list 
The U.S. Entity List, which was briefly mentioned in the introduction, is a supplement to the 
U.S.’ Export Administration Regulations (EAR). EAR governs the export, re-export and 
transfer of items from the U.S. to a foreign country, and such items include both tangible and 
intangible items, such as technology and software. When first published in February 1997, the 
list was created to inform the public of entities that the U.S. government red-flagged for 
engaging in activities that “could result in an increased risk of the diversion of exported, re-
exported and transferred (in-country) items to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program[mes].” (U.S. Department of Commerce, u.d.). 
Today, the U.S. Entity List has expanded significantly, to include any activity that is deemed 
a threat to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests by the U.S. government. The list 
is published by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. It can 
target “businesses, research institutions, governments and individuals” deemed a national 
threat to the United States (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2020).  
Firms on the list are severely restricted from accessing U.S. supply chains and must apply for 
an export license to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) to be exempted from the ban 
to export to entities on the list; however, the BIS will often have a license review policy of 
“presumption of denial”, meaning that they are unlikely to grant such license. 
5.5 Investment bans and delisting from U.S. stock 
exchanges 
On 12 November 2020, President Trump issued the Executive Order on Addressing the Threat 
from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies (The White 
House, 2020). The order’s main statutory authority is derived from the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and section 301 of title 3, 
United States code.   
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This punitive measure banned U.S, investment in firms that the U.S. Department of Defense 
claim to be linked with the Chinese military. The above provisions were used to force the 
delisting of several of China's largest public firms from the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and removed them from several global benchmark indices (Reuters, 1 January 2021). 
The measure also prohibited US investors, both retail and institutional, from engaging in 
securities transactions with more than 40 Chinese firms that are mainly large, well-established 
leaders in their industries and forcing US investors with existing ownership in these firms to 
completely divest themselves by November 2021 (Reuters, 14 January 2021) . 
5.6 Travel bans on employees 
The United States has also imposed punitive measures against a foreign firm by restricting its 
employees from obtaining visas to enter the United States. The statutory authority to impose 
such visa restrictions comes from the Immigration and Nationality Act. It allows for U.S. 
officials to deem aliens inadmissible to the United States on several grounds, e.g., public 
health-, crime- and security-related reasons.  
On 16 July 2020, the Trump Administration announced that it would impose visa restrictions 
on unnamed Huawei Technologies employees, effectively banning them from entering the 
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used the Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which allows him to deem aliens inadmissible if he has reason to believe that 
admitting the unnamed employees to the United States “would have serious adverse foreign 
policy consequences for the United States” (U.S. Department of State, 2020).  
While this form of punitive measure is rarely used on specific foreign firms, it illustrates the 
U.S. government’s willingness to use national security reasons to impose punitive measures 
to target a foreign firm they deem a threat to U.S. interests.  
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6. Punitive measures under the global trade regime  
For decades, global trade rules have been developed to provide predictable and stable trading 
terms that facilitate more trade between countries. Under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) system, which is responsible for operating a global system of trade rules and settle 
trade disputes between its 164 member states (as of February 2021), there are provisions and 
dispute settlement mechanisms in place to address disputes over any trade restricting 
measures, including several of the punitive measures discussed in previous chapters. This 
section will address the punitive measures in the context of the rules set by the WTO system. 
The WTO works towards ensuring that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and as freely as 
possible through its guiding principles (World Trade Organization, u.d.) of: 
1. Trade without discrimination; 
2. Freer trade with less barriers to trade; 
3. Predictability through commitment and transparency; 
4. Promotion of fair competition; and  
5. Encouraging development and economic reform.  
These principles are reflected in all WTO agreements, and therefore, given the trade-disrupting 
nature of many of the U.S. punitive measures against Huawei, an important question is how 
the WTO system addresses these types of punitive measures, which represents deviations from 
WTO’s goal and guiding principles.   
6.1 Non-compliance with WTO rules 
In general, following the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle of GATT Article I, a WTO 
member cannot discriminate between trading partners. Legal scholar Peng (2015) argues that 
the U.S.’s punitive measure that bans Huawei’s access to the U.S. market would be non-
compliant with WTO agreements, as it would give Huawei’s foreign (i.e., non-Chinese) 
competitors, such as Sweden's Ericsson, Finland's Nokia, and South Korea's Samsung 
favourable trade access to the U.S. market.  
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Similarly, this would be applicable to any member state that has imposed a ban on Huawei to 
their markets, such as the UK, Australia, France, and Sweden. By excluding Huawei from 
participating in its 5G networks, they are effectively favouring Huawei’s foreign competitors, 
and thus, violating GATT Article I.  
Additionally, this would also apply to the U.S. punitive measures related to restricting Huawei 
from U.S. and U.S.-originated inputs, as GATT Article I stipulates that:  
[…] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.  
If other non-Chinese firms can access U.S. and U.S.-originated inputs, while Huawei cannot, 
this too would be inconsistent with the MFN principle, as it would favour non-Chinese trading 
partners.  
Secondly, under GATT Article III, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, 
a member state is prohibited from using “internal tax and regulatory measures” to discriminate 
foreign producers over domestic producers. Article III’s provision is relevant if it gives a 
domestic producer favourable treatment over a foreign one. Therefore, in the Huawei case, 
Article III would only be applicable if the member state imposing the trade-restricting measure 
had a domestic firm producing equivalent or “like products” as Huawei. Peng (2015) argues 
that U.S.’s telecom equipment provider Cisco and Huawei produce “like products” (routers 
and network switches), and by excluding Huawei from its market, it is effectively 
discriminating a Chinese firm over a domestic firm. However, the recent restrictions have 
focused on Huawei’s 5G equipment, and competing firms for these types of products are 
fewer, but includes Sweden’s Ericsson, Finland's Nokia, and South Korea's Samsung. 
Therefore, in the case of Sweden’s ban of Huawei to its 5G networks, Article III would be 
relevant and applicable.  
Thirdly, under GATT Article XI, General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, a member 
state is prohibited from imposing or maintaining a quantitative restriction on imports and 
exports from another member state. The U.S.’s export restriction of U.S.-based inputs to 
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Huawei would account as a quantitative restriction. Additionally, member states that has 
imposed bans on Huawei products, such as 5G-related equipment, are effectively imposing a 
quantitative restriction on telecom equipment imports from China. Therefore, both bans, on 
export of U.S.-based inputs to Huawei, and imports from Huawei appear inconsistent with 
Article XI.  
Above, it has been established that many of the punitive measures against Huawei seem to be 
inconsistent with WTO rules. In such case, it begs the questions of why some member states 
still have chosen to impose these punitive measures, and how the WTO can address any 
potential violations of WTO rules. To answer these questions, one must refer to GATT’s 
national security exception and the WTO dispute settlement process.  
6.2 The national security exception 
In the Huawei case, national security has been the primary reason used to justify most of the 
punitive measures imposed on the firm. This is not a coincidence, as the WTO system have 
four provisions that allow a government to exempt from the general trade rules on the basis of 
national security: Article XXI of the GATT, Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), Article 73 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), and Article XXIII of the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA).  
The Security Exceptions provision of Article XXI of the GATT states that: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require  any  contracting  party  to  furnish  any  information  the  disclosure  of  
which  it  considers contrary to its essential security interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic  in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for 
the purpose of supplying a military establishment; 
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(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;  
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of  its  obligations  
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Relating to the imposing of trade restricting punitive measures, the most relevant sections of 
Article XXI are Section (b) and Section (b)(iii). These sections consist of the key points that 
address a country's ability to use the national security exception to impose trade restricting 
measures. The article stipulates that for a WTO member to be able to deviate from its WTO 
obligations, it can "[take] any action which it considers necessary" to protect its "essential 
security interests" during an "emergency in international relations". 
National security is a dynamic term. Pre-20th century thinking equated national security with 
military security; however, today, it has also evolved to include political security, economic 
security, energy and natural resources security, cybersecurity, human security, and 
environmental security (Holmes, 2015). Because national security has such a vague and broad 
definition, it not only allows countries to have dissimilar interpretation of what "essential 
security interests" entails, but it can also give countries the flexibility and credible deniability 
to determine when the national security exception can be applied, as it fits their policy agenda.  
This has caused disagreement among WTO members. Some WTO members argue, based on 
sovereignty, that only the country itself can truly determine what their "essential security 
interests" are. On other side, some members believe this should be open to review by a WTO 
panel (Reinsch, 2019), as the former would allow countries to easily misuse the provision to 
pursue other policy goals that is not rooted in national security concerns.  
The issue of the possibility to misuse the national security exception was already a concern as 
early as during the preparatory sessions that would lead to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) of 1947. During those session, the U.S. delegation stated that the security 
exception provision in the Charter's Article XXI, could not be too broadly interpreted so that 
"under the guise of security, countries will put on measures which really have a commercial 
purpose" (World Trade Organization, u.d.) 
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For decades, GATT/WTO has avoided any ruling on the interpretation of the national security 
exception, as it could provoke member states to withdraw their obligations to the WTO. 
However, in a recent dispute settlement case (DS512) filed by Ukraine against Russia, titled 
“Russia – Traffic in Transit”, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body offered for the first time a 
clarification on how Article XXI’s national security exception should be interpreted. 
Specifically, in this landmark case, the WTO panel established that the invocation of the 
national security exception is not completely self-judging by the member state, but may be 
subject to the scrutiny of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (World Trade Organization, 
2019).  
Relating back to the Huawei case, a WTO member state could impose punitive measures 
against Huawei that would be inconsistent with GATT Articles 1, III and XI and argue that 
the national security exception of Article XXI is applicable. However, after the landmark case 
“Russia – Traffic in Transit”, invoking the national security exception can now be subject to 
the scrutiny of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and could rule that the member state’s 
invocation of the exception is invalid.  
6.3 Dispute Settlement Process 
It has now been established that the U.S. punitive measures against Huawei can be challenged 
in the WTO system; however, in practice, how would the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism handle such an issue? 
The WTO dispute settlement process is divided into three stages: (1) consultations between 
disputing parties; (2) adjudication by panels and (if applicable) by the Appellate Body; and 
(3) the implementation of the ruling. It is important to note that only member states can file a 
complaint under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and not individual firms. 
Therefore, in the Huawei case, the Chinese government would have to file a dispute on 
Huawei’s behalf.  
The WTO estimates that a case normally takes between one year to 15 months to be fully 
processed (World Trade Organization, u.d.); however, recent development has severely 
challenged that time frame. Under the current dispute settlement process, during stage (2), a 
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panel will hear the dispute case and conclude with a report to both parties, as well as to all 
WTO member states. Both parties can then choose to appeal the report, which would send the 
case for review by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body then has the authority to reach a 
final ruling on the case, which would be legally binding for the member states. But since 
December 2019, the Appellate Body has not been able to function due to the U.S. 
government’s refusal to appoint new members to the minimum three-person panel. Without a 
functioning Appellate Body, any appealed case cannot continue to the last stage of the dispute 
settlement process, effectively paralysing the entire WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
Thus, until8 the Appellate Body are appointed new members, the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism is unable to decide on any cases.  
6.4 National security: a pretext for economic 
protectionism? 
In the Huawei case, national security has been the primary reason used to justify most of the 
punitive measures imposed on the firm. Huawei has continually denied wrongdoing and 
rebutted the allegations the U.S. government's claims against the firm. The U.S. has generally 
not provided evidence to support the accusations it has made against the firm and repeatedly 
argues that it does not need to provide this evidence. It believes that Huawei's close ties to the 
Chinese government and its role as a leading telecommunications supplier constitutes a 
security threat in itself.  
Given the nature of the telecommunications industry, Huawei's main business area, it is 
understandable that a government would seek to ensure that its commercial actors operate 
legitimately. Telecommunications is deeply penetrated in today's economy and society, as the 
technology facilitates countless daily activities of individuals, businesses, and governments. 
Not only is it a critical infrastructure, but it also supports the "foundation upon which all other 
critical infrastructure operates" (Lobel, 2014, p. 1).  
 
 
8 As of May 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden has continued his predecessor’s refusal to appoint new members to the Appellate 
Body. 
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In some sense, even if the United States were to categorically use national security solely as a 
pretext for economic protectionism, it is conceptually easy to understand the concern for 
national security given the nature of telecommunications technology, and the critical role it 
has for a country's infrastructure. On the opposite side, it would, for example, be more difficult 
for a government to justify introducing trade-restrictive measures on products that 
conceptually had little relevance to a country’s national security9. Therefore, the level of 
importance an industry has to national security issues is likely, to some extent, to determine 
how easily these trade-restrictive measures can be justified using national security provisions.  
When President Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium imports, it followed a U.S. 
Department of Commerce's report on aluminium that found that these imports threatened to 
impair U.S. national security. One of the arguments it presented was that aluminium was 
needed to upgrade its military aircraft (Chinn, 2018). However, in a memo in response to this 
report, the U.S. Secretary of Defence noted that "U.S. military requirements for steel and 
aluminium each only represent about three [per cent] of U.S. production" (Secretary of 
Defense, n.d.). Thus, he concluded that the military requirement for both steel and aluminium 
supply was not at risk.  
When the United States invoked Article XXI of the GATT to justify these tariffs, Canada, 
Mexico, the E.U., Switzerland, Norway, Russia, Turkey, China and India filed complaints to 
the WTO, arguing that there was "no legitimate or plausible national security rationale for the 
tariffs" (Reinsch, 2019). Some critics of the tariffs note that the U.S.'s supply of steel stem 
primarily from Canada and the E.U., close military allies of the U.S. (BBC, 31 May 2018). 
Similarly, critics did not find President Trump's declaration that some imported automobiles 
and auto parts impaired U.S. national security credible, suggesting that the threat of imposing 
tariffs on these imports were mainly for the purpose of economic protectionism and as leverage 
in his trade negotiations with the E.U. and Japan.  
 
9 This was the case in 1975, when the Swedish government notified the GATT Secretariat its intentions to introduce import 
restricting measures on leather shoes, plastic shoes and rubber boots. (legg til WTO-kilde, 1975) After other GATT signatories 
expressed doubts over the justification, the import restrictions were later discarded (legg til WTO-kilde, 1977).  
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The examples of steel, aluminium and automobiles are notable because all three lacked a 
substantial degree of credibility within the international community that national security was 
the real motivation behind the trade-restrictive measures. This has reinforced the notion that 
the United States would use national security concerns as a pretext to economic protectionism, 
and would further undermine U.S. credibility, even in more security-relevant cases such as the 
Huawei case. It could also encourage other countries to misuse the national security exception 
in pursue of economic goals. 
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7. Punitive measures: key factors to increased risk 
Previous chapters have described how Huawei has been aggressively targeted by a wide range 
of U.S. punitive measures. While the Huawei case is unique, this part will draw upon the 
findings from the case to generalise how certain key factors in a firm may lead to increased 
risk of being targeted by punitive measures from a foreign government. This part will present 
four key factors that are considered important in determining whether a firm is at a heightened 
risk of being the target of punitive measures. These factors are: (1) Firms originating from a 
rival country to the issuer of the punitive measure; (2) Firms that have access to private data; 
(3) Firms engaged in trade of potential dual use items; and (4) Firms operating in an industry 
of strategic or technological important industry.  
The list is not an exhaustive list of risk factors but attempts to draw upon the most relevant 
risk factors concerning punitive measure. The factors must also be understood as interrelated 
to one another, in the sense that one factor may affect the risk assessment of other factors. This 
is especially the case of the first factor, in such that if the firm originates from a rival country, 
the associated risk will trickle down onto the other factors. E.g., a firm that has access to 
private data (factor 2), will by itself have an increased risk of being the target of punitive 
measures, but combined with of originating from a rival country to the issuer of the punitive 
measure (factor 1), the risk is significantly heightened.  
If all factors are applicable to a firm, the associated risk will be at the highest level. Such seems 
to be evident in the Huawei case, which could help explain why it has been so aggressively 
targeted by U.S. punitive measures.   
7.1 Firms originating from a rival country to the issuer of 
the punitive measure 
The first factor looks at whether the firm is originating from a country that is a rival country 
to the sender of the punitive measure. The assumption is that the greater the rivalry between 
two countries, both economic and militarily, the lower the threshold is for a country to impose 
punitive measures on a rival country’s firm. On the other hand, if two countries are close allies, 
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it is assumed that the barriers for one country’s government to impose punitive measures 
against a firm originating from the other country are higher.  
As seen repeatedly, many of the punitive measures are justified through national security 
concerns, and whether legitimate or pretextual, it is easier for a government to justify punitive 
measures to a firm that do not originate from a country that is considered a close security 
allied. For example, Chinese and Russian firms are more likely to be the target of U.S. punitive 
measures than firms originating from Canada or United Kingdom. It was therefore a more 
predicted outcome that the U.S. government declared the Chinese telecom firms Huawei and 
ZTE as threats to its national security, while their main competitors, Sweden’s Ericsson and 
Finland’s Nokia have not received similar punitive measures.  
When assessing the rivalry between two countries, one can do so by identifying whether the 
two countries have aligned economic and security interest. Thus, for especially the latter part, 
whether the two countries are engaged in security alliances such as NATO, may provide strong 
indication of whether this element creates increased risk or not.  
7.2 Firms that have access to private data 
The second factor is whether the firm collects, processes, analyses or in any way has access to 
private data. In this paper, private data is defined broadly as any data that should not be 
publicly available. It may include sensitive data containing classified information and/or 
personal data that may be used to identify individuals and that is susceptible to being exploited 
in some capacity.  
In recent years, firms have increasingly perceived data as an important asset in creating value. 
Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and predictive analysis has also 
increased firm’s ability to leverage on data it can gather from its customers. As the world has 
moved towards greater connectivity, there has also been a growing concern towards the vast 
amount of data is being handled in terms of privacy issues, and the possibility for the data to 
be used for malicious purposes. This has for example led the European Union to strengthen 
the protection of its member states’ citizens data, through the General Data Protection 
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Regulation (GDPR). Other governments are also addressing the perceived threats to its citizens 
privacy, but also from a greater national security perspective.  
The risk associated with this factor is mostly focused on the firm’s output side. In the Huawei 
case, concerns over the existence of a “backdoor” in Huawei’s telecommunications equipment 
was used to justify the punitive measures against Huawei. If that were to be the case, 
proponents of the punitive measures argued, not only could it be used to access personal data 
from private citizens, but also sensitive communication of governmental and military nature.  
In today’s digital age, data is ubiquitous, and most firms have access to user data in some 
capacity. Access to user data itself is not necessarily a factor to increased risk of being targeted 
by punitive measures; however, because of the possibility that data can be maliciously 
exploited, it is easier for governments to rationalise punitive measure against a firm who in 
some capacity has access to private data. The more sensitive the data is, the more reason does 
a government have for imposing punitive measures against the firm, either for legitimate 
concerns for its citizens privacy or national security, but also using those concerns as a pretext 
in pursuit of other policy goals.  
On this basis, firms that in some capacity has access to private data are at increased risk of 
being the target of punitive measures by a government, and the more sensitive the nature of 
the data, the higher the risk becomes. Additionally, when considering the continuous 
technological developments and digitalisation efforts, as more firms are delivering products 
and services that are connected to the internet and can collect large quantities of private data, 
from automobiles, smart home systems, watches, TVs etc., the more relevant this factor has 
become in recent years and will continue to be.     
7.3 Firms engaged in trade of potential dual use items 
The third factor is whether the firm is engaged in trade of potential dual-use items. Dual-use 
items refer to goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military 
applications (European Commission, 2018). Due to national and international security 
considerations, foreign trade of dual-use items is normally highly regulated and subject to 
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strict export controls by most major economies, through national regulations and multilateral 
export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement10.  
By using the Wassenaar Arrangement list as a guide, one can identify ten different categories 
of dual-use goods and technologies: 1. special materials and related equipment, 2. materials 
processing, 3. electronics, 4. computers, 5. telecommunications, 6. information security, 7. 
sensors and lasers, 8. navigation and avionics, 9. marine, 10. aerospace and propulsion 
(Wassebaar Arragement Secretariat, 2020). 
Navigation systems such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) is a classic example of 
a dual-use item, a technology that has a widespread commercial-use (e.g., automotive 
navigation system, ship tracking, cartography, and clock synchronisation) and military-use 
(e.g., missile and projectile guidance, reconnaissance and target tracking).  However, there are 
also many items that are not obvious dual-use items, and which under normal circumstances 
are not considered as such, either by the producer, consumer, or both. For example, in 2000, 
Sony’s highly popular game console, the PlayStation 2, was imposed export controls because 
its memory card could process high quality images, which could potentially also be used in 
missile guidance systems (BBC, 17 April 2000). Therefore, dual-use items need not have an 
actual, existing military application, the theoretical potential itself is enough to define it as a 
dual-use item.  
In the Huawei case, the U.S. government has repeatedly alleged a close link between the 
telecommunications firm with the Chinese military and has even designated Huawei as 
“owned or controlled by the Chinese military” (Reuters, 24 June 2020), suggesting that 
Huawei’s products and services can be used for military applications.  
Consequently, firms which are producing goods and services for commercial use only, but has 
a potential military application, has an increased risk of being targeted by punitive measures, 
and the closer the link exists for a potential military application-usage, the higher the risk 
becomes.   
 
10 Short for The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, 
an intergovernmental forum which facilitates information sharing and standard settings for export controls of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies. As of 2021, it has 42 participating states, including the United States, most EU 
member states, Australia, Argentina, India, and Japan (Wassenaaar, 2020).  
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7.4 Firms operating in an industry of strategic or 
technological importance 
The fourth factor relates to whether the firm is operating in an industry that is of strategic or 
technological importance. Firms who are involved in such industries may be considered more 
critical for the society’s security and welfare, and governments might impose punitive 
measures against foreign firms to limit its reliance on such firms. It may also be a pretext for 
purely economic protectionism or as part of greater geopolitical considerations. 
The ICT industry is often considered a sensitive industry due to the amount of and quality of 
data transmitted. Natural examples would be Huawei and ZTE as already mentioned in this 
paper. The energy sector could be considered critical, particularly if the supplier is a foreign 
player who is domiciled in a country that has no security cooperation with the country. High-
end equipment industry, particularly those, but not limited to, equipment that may be used for 
military application, e.g., aircraft, ship, satellite components, are also at increased risk of being 
targeted.  
Not all countries are in the position to impose punitive measures on a given firm in a given 
industry. Smaller countries with less developed industries may not develop its own capacity 
due to lack of capital, skilled labour, or market. As certain industries require enormous capital 
expenditures, not all countries have the necessary large market to enjoy the economies of scale. 
These countries would embrace foreign companies in order to develop its own economies, 
especially if the country is neutral or friendly towards the country of origin of the foreign firm. 
For smaller countries that have a security cooperation with other countries, they may not be 
allowed to cooperate with a given foreign country. 
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8. Factors determining a firm’s ability to respond 
effectively to punitive measures 
Punitive measures can affect the target firms in many ways, but primarily either from an input 
side or output side, i.e., the firm’s ability to produce its goods and/or services through access 
to technology, commodities, components etc., or the firm’s ability to sell its goods and services 
through access to different markets.  In the Huawei case, the wide range of punitive measures 
has affected both input side and output side of the firm, through a ban on U.S.-based inputs on 
the firm and a ban on Huawei’s participation in roll-out of 5G networks in certain geographical 
markets. This part will present factors that are important in determining a firm’s capability to 
respond effectively to punitive measures.  
A firm’s capability to respond effectively is determined by the alternatives a firm has to the 
restriction or barrier that a punitive measure represent. This part will divide factors into two 
perspectives: market-level conditions, and firm-level conditions. The former conditions relate 
to how important or impactful the punitive measures are for the firm, while the latter 
conditions relate to the firm’s ability to adapt to the measures. 
8.1 Market-level perspective 
Firms that rely heavily on the issuer of punitive measures’ market are assumed to be less likely 
to produce any meaningful countermeasure to the punitive measures imposed on the firm. If a 
firm is reliant on the issuer’s market, can be determined by several factors. 
Share of total sales revenue 
The first factor is whether the firm derives a significant share of its total sales revenue from 
said market. If the firm depends on selling to said market, and is suddenly restricted from 
accessing the market, it will severely impact the firm’s ability to generate revenue, and 
therefore also reduce the firm’s ability to produce any meaningful countermeasures to the 
punitive measures.  
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In Huawei’s case, the majority of its total sales revenue is derived from the Chinese market. 
Thus, the restriction from several Western market has not been affected its main source of 
revenue, which is likely to have allowed Huawei to produce  meaningful countermeasures.    
Reliance on inputs 
The second factor is whether the firm relies heavily on sourcing inputs from said markets, this 
will also negatively affect the firm’s ability to respond to punitive measures. The more 
technologically sophisticated inputs a firm needs from said market to produce its goods or 
services, the more difficult it is assumed for the firm to be able to find alternatives. An example 
of this is found in the Huawei case: when the U.S. government first tightened the export 
restriction to prohibit U.S. firms from supplying Huawei, Huawei was able to respond 
effectively by sourcing from other markets such as South Korea and Taiwan. However, when 
the U.S. government further tightened the export restrictions to include non-U.S. 
semiconductors firms, Huawei struggled to produce its latest smartphone series because they 
required highly advanced semiconductors. Since there were only two manufacturers, TSMC 
and Samsung (both affected by the U.S. rule), able to produce the highly sophisticated 
semiconductors needed, Huawei had no alternative supplier to procure from. If Huawei only 
needed less-sophisticated input, it would have been far more likely to be able to find alternative 
suppliers from other markets. 
Firm’s domestic market 
The third factor is whether the firm originates from a country with a large domestic market 
that it can re-shift its supply to. If the firm can do so, it will positively affect the firm’s ability 
to produce meaningful countermeasure, by giving the firm alternative revenue sources. As 
seen in the Huawei case, when foreign governments imposed punitive measures that restricted 
Huawei from their markets, one of Huawei’s responses were to shift its supply to the Chinese 
market, whose sheer size provides an alternative to the restricted markets of many Western 
countries. 
Access to well-functioning financial markets 
A fourth factor is whether the firm has access to well-functioning financial markets that can 
be critical in the firm’s ability to raise capital needed to finance countermeasures such as R&D 
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investment, building in-house production capabilities, diversifying supply chains and 
investing in strategic partnership.  
Access to domestic and foreign talents 
A fifth factor is whether the firm is based in a country that has readily access to both domestic 
and foreign talents, skilled labour and management. A firm that is based in such a country, 
will be more efficient in attracting qualified personnel in sufficient numbers. In order to attract 
such a work force, the country should have either relaxed immigration laws overall or have a 
fast track for talents and desired workers. For example, the U.S. is known for being able to 
attract talents and skilled engineers from all over the world. China, on the other hand, have 
access to an enormous domestic labour pool of skilled labours and engineers, but may attract 
less foreign talents and workers compared to the U.S. 
8.2 Firm-level perspective  
Strong balance sheets 
Firstly, if the firm has strong balance sheets, i.e., solid cash reserves, low levels of debt and 
adequate credit lines, it is more resilient to shocks (Lund, et al., 2020) and is therefore also 
better equipped to manoeuvre through the challenges of being targeted by punitive measures. 
Punitive measures can often represent high financial liabilities for the targeted firms and create 
high unexpected costs or high negative impact on revenue that can disrupt the firm’s ability to 
resume normal operations. If the firm has weak balance sheets, it may not have the financial 
capabilities to produce meaningful countermeasure to its received punitive measures, and 
larger concessions and bankruptcy might be likely outcomes.  
Capital expenditure requirements 
The second factor is related to the fourth factor in the previous section regarding a firm’s 
access to well-functioning financial markets. Depending on the industry that the firm operates 
in, the capital expenditures needed to increase capacity may vary greatly.  If the industry has 
relatively low capital expenditures requirements, the firm may choose to insource or to 
promote alternative suppliers to increase capacity in the near run. Hence, low capital 
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expenditures requirements will facilitate for stronger countermeasures by the firm, and vice 
versa. 
Organisational culture  
The third factor is whether the firm possesses an organisational culture that allows the firm to 
effectively cope and adapt to new market conditions. Because punitive measures may 
represent vast changes to a firm’s market conditions, such as being restricted from an entire 
market or losing access to key inputs, in order for the firm to be able to respond effectively 
with countermeasures, it must possess the characteristics of an agile business. The 
management should be able to take effective decisions quickly when the punitive measures 
are imposed. Optimally, they should also already have drawn action plans or contingency plans 
for various scenarios. 
Ownership structure 
The fourth factor concerns the firm’s ownership structure. As the management often could be 
beholden to its owners, in many cases it is the owners that may manage changes and crisis 
better. A privately held firm, like Huawei, for example, could be better positioned in managing 
changes than compared to a publicly held firm that has various stakeholders to address. On the 
other hand, state-owned enterprises might also be better positioned to respond effectively to 
punitive measures, as they might be more inclined to receive financial support from the state 
during a crisis, giving them more financial capabilities to counter the negative effects of 
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9. A framework for defining optimal strategy 
towards punitive measures 
This part will present a model for defining an optimal strategy towards punitive measures. 
Any punitive measure will challenge a firm’s status quo and cause some degree of disruption 
to its business operations, and firms should systematically evaluate its vulnerability against 
punitive measures. This framework can be used pre-emptively to evaluate a firm’s current 
vulnerability towards punitive measures, or reactively to evaluate what countermeasures the 
firm should impose to mitigate the negative effects of imposed punitive measures.  
This chapter is divided into three sections: firstly, an input side model related to punitive 
measures that targets the firms’ inputs, i.e., access to commodities, components, technology 
etc.; secondly, an output side, which relates to punitive measures that target the firms access 
to certain markets; lastly, an application of the framework on the Huawei case.   
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a framework for firms to systematically evaluate the 
impact of punitive measures based on two general dimensions related to 1. How severely the 
punitive measures impact the firm and 2. The ease for the firm to find alternative (input or 
output). Based on how the firm evaluates its vulnerability towards punitive measures, the 
framework suggests countermeasures (pre-emptive or reactive) to cope with the punitive 
measures. However, note that the suggested countermeasures are not dogmatic – the optimal 
countermeasures may be subject to interpretation of the situation and there could be a gradual 
transition between each scenario. 
The sections regarding the optimal strategy towards punitive measures in terms of input and 
output level could be regarded as having a somewhat narrow scope. It is on component level 
or geographic market level. The firm’s overall long-term strategy or grand strategy should 
also be considered. Even though many geographic markets may individually be considered 
small, it could in total account for a significant share of its total sales. Losing one small 
geographic market or a supplier could lead to a negative spill over effect. Conversely, winning 
a market may further penetrate the global market and let the firm further entrench its foothold.  
A grand strategy could very well be different from the more short-term strategies. For 
example, to gradually invest more in those seemingly unimportant small markets, or undertake 
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a strategic retreat in certain markets, either permanently or temporarily – depending on what 
would be most beneficial for the firm in the long run. Naturally, not all firms have the financial 
resources to have the freedom of choosing strategies. Some firms may only have the resources 
to undertake ad hoc strategies. Each firm must weigh its abilities and act accordingly. 
9.1 Input side  
This section introduces a framework for defining the optimal strategy towards punitive 
measures for a targeted firm on the input side. In this framework, a firm should identify its 
potential weaknesses in terms of possible or actual punitive measures imposed by a foreign 
government. After identifying these weaknesses, the next step would be to suggest concrete 
short-term countermeasures towards the punitive measures and lastly, develop and implement 
a coherent long-term strategy to manage the potential risk from punitive measures. 
The firm should analyse a strategy against punitive measures along two dimensions, namely 
financial impact and risk/complexity. In financial impact, one shall determine the degree or 
share of total revenue the punitive measure inflicts upon the firm. A high financial impact 
would be inflicted upon a firm typically if the punitive measure hits the firm’s core activities 
or subcomponents of the core product. Financial impact may also be measured by proxies such 
as impact on product performance or growth opportunities. 
Risk/complexity dimension is a catchall for the difficulties the firm would face in diversifying 
its suppliers, finding alternative replacement components/technology, or insourcing a certain 
component. The dimension is related to risk factors such as market structure (monopoly or 
free competition), barriers to entry and technological substitution, innovation, and disruptions. 
To determine whether this dimension is high or low, one may refer to the previous chapter 
which presents key factors to increased risk.  
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By evaluating the firm’s situation along these two dimensions, it may fully exploit its 
bargaining power, while reducing its risk to an acceptable level. The firm classifies its products 
or components into four categories of optimal strategies towards punitive measures. Each of 
these four categories implies a given, optimal strategy towards the punitive measures imposed 
on the firm or the product/component. The optimal strategy ranges from simply ignoring the 
punitive measures, to counter it at all costs, sparing no effort. Note that a product’s category 
may adjust according to changes in supply or demand patterns as well as technological 
development. 
Low financial impact, low risk/complexity: IGNORE  
In the case of low financial impact and low risk/complexity, the subcomponent or technology 
the firm is purchasing has a low impact on its sales or profits. In this scenario, the risk 
associated with finding an alternative supplier is low or the firm can with ease insource the 
said component. The kind of products or raw materials could be goods that are traded freely 
Figure 1: Model on optimal strategy against punitive measures: input side  
 
Source: Author’s own creation  
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in the market with many suppliers. The nature of this good is typically low tech or belonging 
to the primary industry. The firm should keep an eye on the market, so it knows all its 
alternative suppliers in the market. In this case, the firm could choose to simply ignore the 
punitive measures. 
High financial impact, low risk/complexity: SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION 
In the case of high financial impact and low risk/complexity, the targeted activity is typically 
part of the core activity or product and may account for a substantial part of its sales. Typically, 
punitive measures that restrict commodities would be classified as low risk/complexity, 
especially if they are traded in the free/open market. Note that risk/complexity dimension is 
dynamic and subject to world trends and technological development.  
Risk/complexity is not only confined to the production phase, but also to the rest of supply 
chain. Commodities, e.g., might be easy to extrude, but hard or complex to receive (reliable) 
supplies of. Historic examples would be sanctions on oil or steel upon oil refineries and steel 
plants. For example, Japan was the subject of heavy sanctions on U.S steel prior to the World 
War II, and it hampered its economy heavily. Even though the nature of the product might be 
relatively simple, such as a primary industrial product, the risk/complexity may be high due 
to supply difficulties. Nowadays, most commodities are low complexity except notable 
exceptions such as rare earth minerals. 
In the typical case of high impact, low risk/complexity, the firm should strive to diversify its 
supply chain.  A firm might diversity its supply chain both as a pre-emptive risk mitigating 
strategy, and retroactively as a response to punitive measures targeting its access to inputs.   
Low financial impact, high complexity: IGNORE/DIVEST 
When the punitive measures have a low financial impact, but high complexity, the firm is not 
able to produce certain products or services; however, these products or services do not 
account for a large share of the total revenue of the firm. In the case of the low financial impact 
with high complexity, the firm can therefore choose to either ignore or divest its activity out 
of the firm.  
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For example, when the U.S. restrictions on semiconductors hit Huawei’s low-budget 
smartphones, these offered low-margin profits and accounted for low shares of the total 
revenue of the firm. As such, Huawei chose to divest this line of products from the firm, while 
focusing on other countermeasures to respond to activities that had a higher financial impact 
High financial impact, high complexity: FULL SPECTRUM EFFORT 
When a firm is targeted by both high financial impact and high risk/complexity, it represents 
the most critical financial impact on the firm, where typically its core activities are involved. 
The high risk/complexity dimension also indicates that the firm will have difficulties finding 
alternative supply chain solutions, which limits its ability to respond to the punitive measure.  
In such case, a firm should opt for a full spectrum effort where it engages in multiple series 
of risk-mitigating measures available to do its utmost to countermeasure the punitive measure.  
Suggested actions for the firm to consider include but is not limited to: 
1. Diversify supply chains away from the country imposing punitive measures 
2. Co-operate and coordinate with similar firms, suppliers, and/or customers to counter the 
imposed punitive measures  
3. Circumvent the punitive measures by using a third-party agent to import restricted inputs 
on behalf of the targeted firm 
4. Relocate the ownership of the firm’s patents to a country deemed less vulnerable to the 
punitive measures 
5. Promoting open, international standards that is not vulnerable to a specific government’s 
control, but freely accessible to any firm  
6. Reverse engineer a critical product or components of critical importance that is blocked 
through a government’s punitive measure 
7. Stockpile inputs before the punitive measure go into effect  
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8. Lobby own government to file dispute in the WTO system/exert diplomatic pressure on the 
imposing country to revoke the punitive measures 
9.2 Output side  
While the model above describes the optimal strategy towards punitive measures on supplier 
level, it does not suggest how a firm should act if a country impedes or blocks the sales to its 
market, i.e., output side.   
This model shall describe what kind of countermeasures, pre-emptive or reactive, a firm may 
implement when the punitive measure restricts a certain market. There are two dimensions: 
first is the market’s share of the firm’s total revenue (y-axis). This dimension is similar to the 
previous model’s dimension of financial impact but emphasises the importance and reliance 
of a firm to a certain market, rather than generalising it to only consider financial impact.  
Figure 2: Model on optimal strategy against punitive measures: output side  
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
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The second dimension is the difficulty of substituting the geographic market of interest (x-
axis), which refers to the difficulty for the firm to shift its output to alternative markets. In the 
latter dimension, it is assumed that the firm ideally would wish to keep supplying the original 
market as it is a profitable or strategically important market for the firm and shifting its supply 
to an alternative market would yield lower profit margins or be less strategically important 
than the original market11.  
1. Low share of total revenue, low difficulty of substitution: NEGLIGIBLE MARKET 
In this scenario, the punitive measure restricts the targeted firm from selling in a market that 
accounts for a low share of the firm’s total revenue, and the firm can easily substitute the 
market with an alternative market. In this scenario, it is assumed that the firm ideally would 
like to keep the original market; however, due to restrictions, it now must re-evaluate its 
position in said market.  
The low share of total revenue implies that the financial impact of losing the market is not 
high enough to justify the implementation of mitigating strategies focused on retaining the 
market. The low difficulty of substituting this market with alternative market(s), which might 
not be as profitable or strategic important as the original market, implies that the firm’s cost 
of shifting its efforts towards this/these market(s) are feasible. Thus, the combination of low 
share of total revenue and low difficulty of substituting this market deems the market as a 
negligible market, where the optimal strategy would be to ignore/explore alternative markets. 
The strategy suggests that the firm should consider ignoring the original market and seek 
possibilities in alternative geographic or product markets (if applicable12). The firm could also 
consider divesting the business unit or retreat from the market altogether. 
Low share of total revenue, high difficulty of substitution: MINOR MARKET 
This scenario is similar to the previous scenario, but with some notable differences and areas 
of focus. In this scenario, it is assumed that the firm is facing a market restriction from a market 
 
11 If both the original and alternative market yielded the exact same profit margins or had the same strategic importance, it is 
assumed that the firm would already supply to both markets. 
12 This is only applicable if only certain products/services have been restricted in the original market. E.g., in several European 
markets, Huawei’s 5G telecommunications equipment was banned, while Huawei’s mobile phones were not.   
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that accounts for a low share of the firm’s total revenue, but high difficulty of market 
substitution implies that the costs associated with finding alternative markets are high and not 
economically feasible.  
The combination of low share of total revenue and high difficulty of market substitution 
suggest that the market is a minor market, and the firm should consider to ignore or lobby 
against the restriction to this market. The firm should conduct a cost-benefit analysis where it 
considers the costs of the lobbying efforts and the probability of successfully persuading a 
government to revoke the punitive measures, with the benefits of staying in the market. If the 
costs exceed the benefits, the firm should opt to ignore the punitive measures, and retreat from 
the market.  
High share of total revenue, low difficulty of substitution: ESSENTIAL MARKET  
In this scenario, the targeted geographic market accounts for a considerably share of the firm’s 
total revenue, while the firm can fairly easily find alternative markets. Given the low difficulty 
of finding an alternative market to supply to, the firm should explore this opportunity. 
However, given the high share of total revenue derived from this market, it cannot be deemed 
a negligible market.   
The combination of a high share of total revenue derived from this market with the low 
difficulty of finding a substitute market suggests that that it is an essential market. Further, it 
implies that the opportunity costs of losing this market are higher than the costs associated 
with implementing efforts against the market restricting punitive measure.  Therefore, the firm 
should utilise a hybrid approach, where it focuses its efforts and resources on exploring 
alternative markets and focuses its efforts and resources on lobbying for the market restricting 
punitive measures to be revoked.  
High share of total revenue, high difficulty of substitution: CRUCIAL MARKET 
In this scenario, the firm derives a high share of total revenue from the market, and there is a 
high difficulty of substituting this market with an alternative market.  The combination of these 
two factors implies that the market is both highly profitable and of high strategic importance 
to the firm, whilst few options exist for the firm to replace this market. Therefore, this market 
is deemed a crucial market for the firm.  
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Given these conditions, the firm should spare no effort in attempting to countermeasure the 
market restricting punitive measure, as the alternative would be for the firm to surrender its 
position or divest its assets. A full spectrum effort should be considered, where the firm 
engages in multiple series of countermeasures available to do its utmost to reverse the negative 
effects of the punitive measure.  
1. Modify the product to satisfy new requirement; if not sufficient, reconsider the feasibility 
of the entire product market or geographic market and consider retreating from the market 
2. Shift the firm’s business operations to a product that does not fall under the imposed punitive 
measures  
3. Dispute the legality, the scope, and the level of punitive measures through judicial means 
4. Lobby own government to file a dispute in the WTO system/exert diplomatic pressure on 
the imposing country to revoke the punitive measures 
5. Co-ordinate with important stakeholders, such as collaborating firms, suppliers, and 
customers to launch a campaign that counters the imposed punitive measures 
9.3 Applying the framework on the Huawei case 
This section will apply the above framework on the Huawei case. With the many punitive 
measures against Huawei, the case is both complex and extensive; however, for the sake of 
conciseness, the framework is applied in simplified version of the Huawei case.  
The punitive measures that have targeted Huawei’s input side are primarily related to the 
designation of Huawei on the U.S. entity list. Initially, the trade blacklist restricted Huawei 
from accessing key inputs from its U.S. suppliers. Restricting of this input was of high 
financial impact to Huawei, as it jeopardised its ability to produce some of its most core 
business products, including 5G equipment and smartphones. However, the risk/complexity 
was somewhat manageable for Huawei because it was still able to source similar inputs from 
non-U.S. manufacturers. Therefore, at this point of time, the U.S. entity list represented a 
punitive measure with high financial impact and relative low risk/complexity. The 
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framework suggested action for Huawei would therefore be to undergo supply chain 
diversification.  
Indeed, following the initial trade blacklisting of Huawei, it did take steps to reduce its reliance 
on U.S. chip manufacturers, by shifting its input source from U.S. semiconductor designer to 
an in-house semiconductor designer that used a non-U.S. semiconductor manufacturer, i.e., 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). 
When the U.S. government tightened its export control on Huawei to also include non-U.S. 
firms that used U.S.-based technology, the risk/complexity dimension changes from low to 
high risk/complexity, as almost all semiconductor production is based on some U.S. 
technology, and thus, severely limiting Huawei’s ability to find alternative sources of inputs. 
Therefore, as the framework suggests, Huawei’s optimal countermeasure would be to apply 
full spectrum efforts, which it seemingly has done. Some of the many countermeasures it has 
deployed include stockpiling semiconductors, promoting open semiconductor design 
standards (RISC-V), heavily investing in R&D, and partnering with domestic firms to build 
semiconductor plant.   
The punitive measures that have targeted Huawei’s output side are primarily related to the 
bans several countries have imposed against its participation in their 5G networks roll-out. 
While the U.S. market may only represent a smaller share of Huawei’s total revenue, if one 
treats the combined geographic markets of countries that the U.S. has successfully pressured 
to impose a full or partial ban, this punitive measure represents a high share of total 
revenue. On the other hand, Huawei’s difficulty in substituting these markets with other 
markets is still manageable, as there are other markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
still accessible to Huawei, Thus, the punitive measure represents a low difficulty of market 
substitution, and further, would indicate that the combined geographic markets that has 
imposed a ban on Huawei represents an essential market. 
Under the framework, an essential market suggests that the firm should opt for the hybrid 
approach of lobbying the government(s) to revoke the ban, while also exploring alternative 
markets. Although little information has been made publicly available regarding Huawei’s 
internal strategy, it is reasonable to assume that Huawei has put considerable efforts into 
lobbying against the ban against them. It has also seemed to re-focus its efforts onto 
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alternative markets, including its large domestic market. For example, in March 2021, 
Huawei was reported to seek to deliver ICT solutions to a completely new market, namely 
Chinese fish farms. It was also reported to exploring the possibility of delivering products 
and services to the Chinese mining industry, citing specifically the U.S. punitive measures as 
the motivation for exploring these new markets (Bloomberg, 14 March 2021)  
In terms of its grand strategy, Huawei may have retreated parts of its business units from some 
geographic markets. While it has divested its Honor smartphone brand and its submarine cable 
subsidiary, it has kept its premium Huawei smartphone brand and developed its own 
smartphone and Internet of Things operating system (Harmony OS), as an alternative to 
Google’s Android OS. It has also focused on selling to the Chinese market and other 
geographic markets not as vulnerable to punitive measures. Additionally, it has invested large 
amounts of capital in semiconductor expertise and other business areas that are related to its 
core business. Huawei’s grand strategy is to provide its customers telecommunications 
equipment and devices and related products and services. When faced with punitive measures, 










This thesis has examined the U.S. punitive measures against Huawei. The first notable 
measures undertaken by the U.S. against Huawei occurred in 2008. Since then, the U.S. 
punitive measures have inflicted large financial losses for Huawei, as well as for Huawei’s 
suppliers. It seemingly will also cause economic disadvantages for would-be customers in 
markets where Huawei has been restricted access to participate in the roll-out of 5G networks. 
The punitive measures have also severely complicated Huawei’s operations, particularly in 
Western markets, forcing it to retreat from certain markets. As not uncommon with economic 
policies, the campaign against Huawei has also led to some unintended consequences, notably 
partially causing the chip shortage in the automotive industry, likely design-out of U.S. 
technology in some parts of the global supply chain and increased Chinese technological self-
reliance. 
The thesis outlined various common punitive measures the U.S. government possesses in its 
legal arsenal, as well as the legal foundation of punitive measures and dispute settlements in 
the WTO framework. The WTO provides a legal and institutional framework that seeks to 
ensure smooth, predictable, and free trade flow. The campaign against Huawei may be 
considered as running against the guiding principles of the WTO, and inconsistent with GATT 
provisions. However, the WTO specifically has national security as a reason for exemption 
from these guiding principles. There is, however, a precedence that the national security 
exception should not be unilaterally settled by a country but may be subject to the scrutiny of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The big elephant in the room, however, is that the punitive 
measures imposed by the U.S. out of national security concerns are regarded by many to be a 
pretext for economic protectionism. 
Moreover, the thesis identified key factors that increase the risk for a firm to be targeted by 
punitive measures by a foreign government. The key factors are (1) Firms originating from a 
rival country to the issuer of the punitive measure; (2) Firms that have access to private data; 
(3) Firms engaged in trade of potential dual use items; and (4) Firms operating in an industry 
of strategic or technological important industry. 
Later, key factors that may determine a firm’s ability to effectively cope with punitive 
measures were outlined. The factors are divided into two, the first is market-level conditions, 
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the second is firm-level conditions. At the market-level, we have factors such as: share of total 
sales revenue, reliance on inputs, firm’s domestic market, access to well-functioning financial 
markets, access to domestic and foreign talents. At the firm-level, we have strong balance 
sheets, capital expenditure requirements, organisational culture, and ownership structure. 
Finally, this thesis sought to create a theoretical framework to define a firm’s optimal strategy 
towards punitive measures – what the firm ought to do to counter the punitive measures. The 
framework consists of an input side model and an output side model, where the former 
considers the input, component, or supplier side, while the latter considers the output or market 
side. It analyses and categorises a firm among four scenarios along two dimensions, 1) how 
severely the punitive measures impact the firm, and 2) the ease for the firm to find alternative 











Ahrens, N. (2013). China’s Competitiveness: Myth, Reality, and Lessons for the United States 
and Japan - Case Study: Huawei. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS). 
BBC. (17 April 2000). Military fears over PlayStation2. Retrieved April 16, 2021, from BBC 
News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/716237.stm 
BBC. (17 November 2020). Huawei sells youth brand over tech restrictions. Retrieved from 
BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54970003 
BBC. (31 May 2018). US tariffs: Steel and aluminium levies slapped on key allies. Retrieved 
February 16, 2021, from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
44320221 
Bloomberg. (14 March 2021). Huawei Pivots to Fish Farms, Mining After U.S. Blocks Its 
Phones. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-
03-14/huawei-pivots-to-fish-farms-mining-after-u-s-blocks-its-phones 
Bloomberg. (16 June 2019). Huawei Braces for Phone Sales Drop of Up to 60 Million 
Overseas. Retrieved from Bloomberg: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-16/huawei-braces-for-a-steep-
drop-in-overseas-smartphone-sales 
Bloomberg. (18 July 2020). U.K. Told Huawei That U.S. Pressure Contributed to Ban: 
Observer. Retrieved from Bloomberg: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-18/u-k-told-huawei-that-u-s-
pressure-contributed-to-ban-observer 
Bloomberg. (2 February 2021). China Stockpiles Chips, Chip-Making Machines to Resist U.S. 
Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-
02/china-stockpiles-chips-and-chip-making-machines-to-resist-u-s 
 
   
 
70 
Bloomberg. (22 October 2020). Huawei Outhustles Trump by Hoarding Chips Vital for China 
5G. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-
22/huawei-outhustles-trump-by-stockpiling-chips-needed-for-china-5g 
Bloomberg. (7 December 2010). Locke Says Sprint’s Chief Was Called About Huawei Bid 
Concerns. Retrieved from Bloomberg: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-07/commerce-s-locke-says-
sprint-s-chief-was-called-about-huawei-bid-concerns 
Bown, C. B. (2020, December 18). How the United States marched the semiconductor industry 
into its trade war with China. Peterson Institute for International Economics Working 
Paper No. 20-16. Retrieved from https://www.piie.com/publications/working-
papers/how-united-states-marched-semiconductor-industry-its-trade-war-china 
Broadman, H. G. (2019, January 4). U.S. Foreign Investment Policy Gets A Tougher But More 
Transparent CFIUS. Retrieved from Forbes: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2019/01/04/u-s-foreign-investment-
policy-gets-a-tougher-but-more-transparent-cfius/?sh=76c9d58c1fe6 
Brown, H. L. (2001). Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 1998 Amendments to the 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does 
the Government's Reach Now Exc. North Carolina Journal of International Law, 
26(2), 239-360. Retrieved from 
https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1
696&context=ncilj 
Caine, K., Franceski, L. G., & Rosenberg, A. L. (2018, August 16). President Trump signs 
into law CFIUS reform bill. Retrieved from Norton Rose Fulbright: 
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/2405ee63/president
-trump-signs-into-law-cfius-reform-bill 
Chinn, M. (2018, June 6). What is the National Security Rationale for Steel, Aluminum and 
Automobile Protection? Retrieved February 10 2021, from Econofact: 
 





CNBC. (14 May 2021). Chip shortage expected to cost auto industry $110 billion in revenue 
in 2021. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/14/chip-shortage-expected-
to-cost-auto-industry-110-billion-in-2021.html 
CNBC. (24 August 2020). TikTok reveals detailed user numbers for the first time. Retrieved 
from CNBC: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-reveals-us-global-user-
growth-numbers-for-first-time.html 
Congressional Research Service. (2020). CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA. Congressional 
Research Service. Retrieved from 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10952 
De Cremer, D., & Tao, T. (2015, June 11). Huawei's Culture Is the Key to Its Success. 
Retrieved from Harvard Business Review: https://hbr.org/2015/06/huaweis-culture-is-
the-key-to-its-success 
Department of Justice. (2009, 19 November). tatoil ASA Satisfies Obligations Under Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement and Foreign Bribery Charges Are Dismissed. Retrieved from 
Department of Justice: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statoil-asa-satisfies-
obligations-under-deferred-prosecution-agreement-and-foreign-bribery 
DeWoskin, K. J. (2001, September). The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector in China. 
The China Quarterly, 630-654. 
Diamant, M. S., Sullivan, C. W., & Smith, J. H. (2019). FCPA Enforcement Against U.S. and 
Non-U.S.Companie. Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review, 8(2), 353-





   
 
72 
European Commission. (2003, September 23). China to participate in GALILEO. Retrieved 
from European Commission: Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/china-participate-galileo-0_en 
European Commission. (2020, January 29). Secure 5G networks: Questions and Answers on 
the EU toolbox. Retrieved from European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_127 
Financial Times. (1 November 2020). Huawei develops plan for chip plant to help beat US 
sanctions. Retrieved from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/84eb666e-
0af3-48eb-8b60-3f53b19435cb 
Financial Times. (18 December 2009). Huawei beats Ericsson for network contract. Retrieved 
from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/dfb2b7f6-ebca-11de-930c-
00144feab49a 
Financial Times. (23 December 2020). European tech accuses US of using sanctions to shut 
it out of China . Retrieved from Financial Times: 
https://www.ft.com/content/7baa8caf-ca3f-4d95-967c-e315a3ee348f 
Financial Times. (27 September 2020). China’s biggest chipmaker SMIC hit by US sanctions. 
Retrieved from Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/7325dcea-e327-4054-
9b24-7a12a6a2cac6 
Gartner. (2021, February 9). Gartner Says Apple and Samsung Extended Their Lead as Top 
Semiconductor Customers in 2020 . Retrieved from Gartner: 
https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2021-02-09-gartner-says-
apple-and-samsung-extended-their-lead-as 
Holmes, K. R. (2015). What Is National Security? The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-
10/2015_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_What%20Is%20National%20Security.pdf 
Huang, K., & Madnick, S. (2020, August 28). The TikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company. 
Retrieved November 17, 2020, from Harvard Business Review: 
https://hbr.org/2020/08/the-tiktok-ban-should-worry-every-company 
 
   
 
73 
Huawei. (2020). 2019 Annual Report. Shenzhen: Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd. 
Retrieved from https://www-file.huawei.com/-/media/corporate/pdf/annual-
report/annual_report_2019_en.pdf?la=en 
Huawei. (2020, November 17). Statement, 17 November 2020. Retrieved from Huawei: 
https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2020/11/huawei-honor-statement 
Jackson, J. K. (2020, February 14). The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS). Retrieved from Congressional Research Service: 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf 
Lobel, M. (2014). Security risks and responses in an evolving telecommunications industry. 
Pwc. Retrieved from 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/communications/publications/communications-
review/assets/cyber-telecom-security.pdf 
Lund, S., Manyika, J., Woetzel, J., Barriball, E., Krishnan, M., Alicke, K., . . . Hutzler, K. 
(2020). Risk, resilience, and rebalancing in global value chains. McKinsey Global 





Masters, J. (2019, August 12). What Are Economic Sanctions? Retrieved September 5, 2020, 
from Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-
are-economic-sanctions 
McVey, T. B. (2019). U.S. Sanctions Laws: Dangers Ahead For Foreign Companies. 





   
 
74 
Mirenda, A. D., & Smith, G. A. (2013, February 19). Business Crimes Alert. Retrieved from 
Foley Hoag LLP: https://foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-
updates/2013/february/increased-risk-of-fcpa-prosecution-of-foreign-national-
executives-021913 
Nikkei. (23 October 2020). Huawei's Q3 growth slows as 'intense' US pressure hits supplies. 
Retrieved from Nikkei Asia: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-
crackdown/Huawei-s-Q3-growth-slows-as-intense-US-pressure-hits-supplies 
Oxford Economics. (2020). Restricting Competition in 5G Network Equipment Throughout 
Europe: An Economic Impact Study. London: Oxford Economics. 
Peng, Z. (2020, August 14). Is China's BeiDou a Better Version of GPS and GLONASS? 
Retrieved from Equal Ocean: https://equalocean.com/analysis/2020082614631 
Reinsch, W. A. (2019, April 5). The WTO’s First Ruling on National Security: What Does It 
Mean for the United States? Retrieved January 14, 2021, from Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS): https://www.csis.org/analysis/wtos-first-ruling-national-
security-what-does-it-mean-united-states 
Reuters. (1 January 2021). NYSE starts process of delisting three Chinese telco companies. 
Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-nyse-delisting-
idUSKBN29621Q 
Reuters. (12 December 2018). Exclusive: Trump says he could intervene in U.S. case against 
Huawei CFO. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
huawei-tech-exclusive-idUSKBN1OA2PQ 
Reuters. (14 January 2021). Trump bolsters ban on U.S. investments in China. Retrieved from 
Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-signs-amended-china-
investment-ban-requiring-complete-divestment-by-nov-2021-01-14/ 
Reuters. (15 January 2021). Trump's China tech war backfires on automakers as chips run 




   
 
75 
Reuters. (15 july 2020). Pompeo says U.S. to impose visa curbs on Huawei over rights. 
Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-huawei-
idUSKCN24G268 
Reuters. (15 May 2020). U.S. moves to cut Huawei off from global chip suppliers as China 
eyes retaliation. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
huawei-tech-exclusive-idUSKBN22R1KC 
Reuters. (16 May 2019). China's Huawei restricted from using U.S. suppliers. Retrieved from 
Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech-commerce-
idUSKCN1SM2MG 
Reuters. (16 May 2019). Huawei's $105 billion business at stake after U.S. broadside. 
Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-huawei-
analysis-idUSKCN1SM123 
Reuters. (17 January 2021). Exclusive: Trump admin slams China's Huawei, halting shipments 
from Intel, others - sources. Retrieved from Reuters: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech-exclusive-idUSKBN29M0KD 
Reuters. (17 October 2012). Exclusive: White House review finds no evidence of spying by 
Huawei - sources. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
huawei-spying-idUSBRE89G1Q920121017 
Reuters. (19 February 2011). Huawei backs away from 3Leaf acquisition. Retrieved from 
Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-3leaf-idUSTRE71I38920110219 
Reuters. (19 May 2019). Exclusive: Google suspends some business with Huawei after Trump 
blacklist - source. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-
tech-alphabet-exclusive-idUSKCN1SP0NB 
Reuters. (22 December 2013). SPECIAL REPORT-In satellite tech race, China hitched a ride 
from Europe. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/breakout-
beidou-idUSL4N0JJ0J320131222 
 
   
 
76 
Reuters. (23 February 2008). 3Com rebuff due to 'complexities' and costs -Huawei. Retrieved 
from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-3com-
idUSHKG5460020080223 
Reuters. (24 August 2010). US senators raise concern about Huawei-Sprint deal. Retrieved 
from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-china-telecoms/us-senators-raise-
concern-about-huawei-sprint-deal-idUSN2425764520100824 
Reuters. (24 June 2020). Exclusive: Trump administration says Huawei, Hikvision backed by 
Chinese military. Retrieved March 26, 2021, from Reuters: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-exclusive-idUSKBN23V309 
Reuters. (25 November 2019). U.S.-based chip-tech group moving to Switzerland over trade 
curb fears. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-
semiconductors-insight-idUSKBN1XZ16L 
Reuters. (26 August 2020). China to import $300 billion of chips for third straight year: 
industry group. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
semiconductors-idUSKBN25M1CX 
Reuters. (3 June 2019). Nokia says it has moved ahead of Huawei in 5G orders. Retrieved 
from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nokia-5g-idUSKCN1T428W 
Reuters. (5 December 2018). Top Huawei executive arrested on U.S. request, clouding China 
trade truce. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-
huawei-idUSKBN1O42S1 
Reuters. (8 January 2018). Huawei's AT&T U.S. smartphone deal collapses. Retrieved from 
Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-at-t-huawei-tech-idUSKBN1EX29E 
Secretary of Defense. (n.d.). Department of Defense Memo: Response to Steel and Aluminum 




   
 
77 
SEMI. (2020, August 24). SEMI Statement on New U.S. Export Control Regulations. 
Retrieved from SEMI: https://www.semi.org/en/news-media-press/semi-press-
releases/semi-export-control 
The New York Times. (17 March 2019). U.S. Campaign to Ban Huawei Overseas Stumbles 
as Allies Resist. Retrieved from The New York Times: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/huawei-ban.html 
The New York Times. (24 December 2020). With Money, and Waste, China Fights for Chip 
Independence. Retrieved from The New York Times: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/technology/china-semiconductors.html 
The Wall Street Journal. (16 July 2020). A Pandemic and Huawei Woes? No Problem, Says 
Taiwan’s Chip Champion. . Retrieved from The Wall Street Journal: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-pandemic-and-huawei-woes-no-problem-says-
taiwans-chip-champion-11594899491 
The Wall Street Journal. (19 September 2020). Trump Signs Off on TikTok Deal With Oracle, 
Walmart. Retrieved November 19, 2020, from The Wall Street Journal: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-signs-off-on-deal-allowing-tiktok-to-continue-u-
s-operations-11600551352?mod=article_inline 
The Washington Post. (1 March 2021). Biden can’t fix the chip shortage any time soon. Here’s 
why. Retrieved from The Washington Post: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/01/semiconductor-shortage-
halts-auto-factories/ 
The White House. (2020, November 12). Executive Order on Addressing the Threat from 
Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies. 





   
 
78 
The White House. (2020, August 14). Order Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by 
ByteDance Ltd. Retrieved from The White House: 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/order-regarding-
acquisition-musical-ly-bytedance-ltd/ 
Townsend, T. (2020, April 15). The Aggressive Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Economic 
Sanctions: Foreign Company Exposure to OFAC Enforcement. Retrieved August 25, 
2020, from The National Law Review: 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/aggressive-extraterritorial-reach-us-economic-
sanctions-foreign-company-exposure-to 
TrendForce. (2020, October 5). China's Semiconductor Industry to Brace for Impact as SMIC 
Assesses Export Restrictions Placed by U.S., Says TrendForc. Retrieved from 
TrendForce: https://www.trendforce.com/presscenter/news/20201005-10499.html 
U.S. Department of Commerce. (2020). CBC FAQs - 1. What is the Entity List? Retrieved 
August 26, 2020, from Bureau of Industry and Security: 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/cbc-faqs/faq/281-1-what-is-the-entity-list 
U.S. Department of Commerce. (n.d.). Entity List. Retrieved August 26, 202, from Bureau of 
Industry and Security: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-
parties-of-concern/entity-list 
U.S. Department of State. (2020, July 15). U.Michael R. Pomepo, Press Statement: Visa 
Restrictions on Certain Employees of Chinese Technology Companies that Abuse 
Human Rights. Retrieved October 15, 2020, from https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-
imposes-visa-restrictions-on-certain-employees-of-chinese-technology-companies-
that-abuse-human-rights/index.html 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2018, April 6). Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, 
Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity. Retrieved August 
25, 2020, from U.S. Department of the Treasury: 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0338 
 
   
 
79 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (n.d.). Sanctions Programs and Country Information. 
Retrieved August 25, 2020, from U.S. Department of the Treasury: 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-
country-information 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2008, December 15). SEC Charges Siemens AG 
for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery. Retrieved from U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission: https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm 
Wassebaar Arragement Secretariat. (2020). Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: List of Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies and Munitions List. Retrieved April 15, 2021, from 
https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2020/12/Public-Docs-Vol-II-2020-List-of-
DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List-Dec-20-3.pdf 
Wassenaaar. (2020, December 17). About us. Retrieved April 16, 2021, from Wassenaar: 
https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/ 
Westbrook, A. D. (2019, December 6). Securing the Nation or Entrenching the Board? The 
Evolution of CFIUS Review of Corporate Acquisitions. Marquette Law Review, 102, 
643-699. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3490830 
White House. (2019, May 15). Executive Order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. Retrieved from The White 
House: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-
securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/ 
World Trade Organization. (2019). Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit. 
Retrieved March 25, 2021, from World Trade Organization: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds512_e.htm 
World Trade Organization. (n.d.). Article XXI: Security Exceptions. Retrieved from WTO: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art21_gatt47.pdf 
 
   
 
80 
World Trade Organization. (n.d.). The WTO. Retrieved March 3, 2021, from World Trade 
Organization: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm 
World Trade Organization. (n.d.). UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: SETTLING DISPUTES: A 
unique contribution. Retrieved March 25, 2021, from World Trade Organization: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm 
WTO. (n.d.). Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation. Retrieved 
from https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art3_e.pdf 
Zakaria, F. (2020, August 28). America’s excessive reliance on sanctions will come back to 




Zeng, D. Z. (2010). Building Engines for Growthand Competitiveness in China: Experience 
with Special Economic Zonesand Industrial Clusters. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
